

Marine Corps

APR 1959

FORTY CENTS

Gazette



KÖGUN

The Japanese Army in The Pacific War

By Saburo Hayashi

Translated by

Dr. Alvin D. Coox

Published by The Marine Corps Association

**A factual history of the Japanese Army and its operations
in the Pacific War.**

Available 11 May.

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
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LVT-H6

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Marine Corps Gazette

APRIL 1959
NUMBER 4
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THIS MONTH'S COVER The T219E4, 90mm Recoilless Rifle is undergoing evaluation at the Equipment Board, MCLFDC, Quantico, Va. AGySgt Robert F. Fleischauer drew the cover picture after observing field tests of the weapon. The T219E4 has increased range and is more accurate than the present 3.5" Rocket Launcher.

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
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Opinions expressed in the Gazette do not necessarily reflect the attitude of the Navy Department nor of Headquarters, United States Marine Corps

THEY PROBE THE FUTURE OF DEEP-SEA TELEPHONY



"Dry Land Ocean," under construction at Bell Laboratories, simulates ocean floor conditions, is used to test changes in cable loss. Sample cables are housed in pipes which contain salt water under deep-sea pressure. The completed trough is roofed in and is filled with water which maintains the pipes at 37° F., the temperature of the ocean floor.

Deep in the ocean, a submarine telephone cable system is extremely hard to get at for adjustment or repair. This makes it vitally important to find out what can happen to such a system *before* it is installed.

Bell Telephone Laboratories engineers do this by means of tests which simulate ocean floor conditions on dry land. Among many factors they test for are the effects of immense pressures on amplifier housings and their water-resistant seals. They also test for agents which work very slowly, yet can cause serious destruction over the years—chemical action, marine borers and several species of bacteria which strangely thrive under great pressures.

Through this and other work, Bell Telephone Laboratories engineers are learning how to create better deep-sea telephone systems to connect America to the rest of the world.



Highly precise instruments developed by Bell Laboratories engineers are used to detect infinitesimal changes in cable loss—to an accuracy of ten millionths of a decibel.



Seawater and sediment in bottle characterize ocean floor. Test sample of insulation on coiled wire is checked for bacterial attack by conductance and capacitance tests.



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MESSAGE CENTER

First Impressions

... This is in reply to the Observation Post article by LtCol W. P. J. Drakeley, Jr., USMCR, entitled "Payoff for VTU," which appeared in the February issue of the GAZETTE.

My initial reaction after having read "Payoff for VTU" was: "Sir, how preposterous!" After reading the article again my initial reaction was more than confirmed, and I said to myself, "Preposterous is not a strong enough word to describe the nonsense advocated and spelled out in this article." I trust that this feeling is harbored in the minds of only a very small minority of our Reserve officers.

Maj W. J. Skvaril

MB, Navy #138
FPO New York

Payment for Opportunity

... This will be the first time I have ever written to Message Center, but I feel that an answer is due from a member of the Marine Corps Reserve to LtCol W.P.J. Drakeley, Jr.'s article, "Payoff for the VTU."

First, may I say that I'm no "boot" as far as the Corps is concerned, having spent over 11 years as a Regular and the last 3 as a Reserve. In other words I've been a Marine for over 14 years.

All of the talk of a "greedy world . . . never ending rat race with greedy employers, greedy competitors, greedy acquaintances and greedy public officials" may be true, but who says we Reserve officers have to join such a crew? We all must make money in order to live and raise our families, but I fail to see that our every waking moment must be devoted to "money grabbing."

I think I speak for many officers in the Reserve program who point

with pride to the fact that we give our time and effort trying to do our part in training men and keeping ourselves up-to-date on the latest tactics and military techniques.

As for training Reserve officers so that they become "more successful in their careers today" by teaching leadership principles used in business and getting a "by product" from this training that would be



Marine Corps leadership, I don't see how the Marine Corps could profit from this setup. How would officers stay abreast of the times in tactics, logistical support, communications and all of the hundreds of other subjects that change from day to day. Certainly leadership is important—Marine leadership—the ability to lead men, that is!

What I have been trying to say is there are many Reserve officers who are proud to devote their effort to adding in their small way to the security of our Corps and country. If the Marine Corps calls upon us to serve on one of those "tiny, worthless islands" our only hope is that we can serve with honor, and protect this land of ours that gives us the opportunity to live as we please.

Capt John C. Gordy, Jr., USMCR
CO, 28th Infantry Co.
Lafayette, La.

Gray Flannel Brigade

... In reply to LtCol Drakeley's article "Pay Off for VTU" I would like to point out that the Colonel did not include in his comments any place the words either "command" or "commander."

It seems the Colonel would advise the Marine Corps to develop a Reserve Corps of "junior executives" rather than a corps of thoroughly trained men who could be relied upon to take command at the outset of a national emergency.

I remember several months ago reading in a military publication that when on liberty and attired in civilian clothing, a Marine should dress in the manner of the junior executive. This is good advice concerning the civilian liberty uniform, but has nothing to do with the requirements and duties of Marine Corps officers.

Today's Marine Corps officer, be he Regular or Reserve, must be made to realize that someday, maybe not in the immediate future but sooner than expected, he may have to take command of a detachment, a company, a battalion or even a regiment, and that the quality of leadership alone will not make him fit for the responsibility. And a greater responsibility no man can have. There is no position a man can attain in civilian life that would compare with that of a military commander except possibly that of the Commander in Chief.

Today's Marine Corps officer must also be made to realize that he is a commander so long as he has one man for whom he is responsible and that a unit designation is not necessary to make a command.

Used wisely the authority of the local commanders could resolve most of the shortcomings, real and imagined, of the Marine Corps today.

Command encompasses words that are used increasingly more throughout the Marine Corps today, such as supervise, coordinate, plan, manage

(Continued on page 6)

★
The GAZETTE will pay \$5.00 for each letter published in Message Center
★



FLOAT IT, FLY IT, CARRY IT—

TOUGH NEW MARINE CORPS MICROWAVE RADIO

On remote beaches, atop isolated mountains, in helicopter assaults—wherever the Marines go, their Raytheon microwave communications system goes, too!

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One of the first systems using super high frequencies to be made in quantity, the new Raytheon AN/TRC-27 is an important advance in tactical electronic equipment.



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[Continued from page 4]

and many others. It would seem that officers who use these words individually expect to be made less responsible for the outcome of the remainder of the meaning of the word command.

The Marine Corps needs officers it can trust to command troops tactically and administratively.

Making himself fit to command should be the goal of every Marine Corps officer. Any who enter, or are now part of the Marine Corps, with a lesser goal than this are falling far short of what the Marines must have for officers.

No one on this earth can put a price tag on the dedication and conscience that is required of a military commander.

ASSgt R. L. Runkle

3d Bn
MCSC, Barstow, Calif.

Camera Angles

... I have no desire to stir up a controversy on the subject of Marine Corps publicity, but I would like to give you my opinion on Capt Mathis' letter, "Battle of the TV Screen" (OBSERVATION POST: Feb '59).

Privately, I have felt that the current lack of a Marine Corps television series has been good for the Corps. I still wince when I recall that fine documentary "Uncommon Valor" being re-run dozens of times on the cheapest local channel, interrupted ad nauseam by two-bit commercials.

I believe that any series of stories, fictional or otherwise, will wind up on the TV screens distorted, overly-melodramatic and notably bad for international relations. What stories would we show—boot camp? My memories are still vivid these long years later, but I recall few incidents suitable for family viewing. Shall we show Marines killing Germans in WWI? This would be in questionable taste today. Or perhaps a fertile source of material could be found based upon Marines killing Japs in WWII? Hardly; the Japanese are now our friends.

It might be that the obstacles I have mentioned could be overcome by a good producer, brilliant writers

and an understanding sponsor, but I rather hope not. I suspect that no matter how good the show, the Marine Corps would be submitting its magnificent heritage to the jaded and cynical gaze of the American viewer for the prime purpose of huckstering more cigarettes, nose-drops and brassieres. We don't need publicity that much.

Maj C. F. Runyan

512 Monroe Place
Falls Church, Va.

The Name's the Same

... Regarding the unit transplacement plan that is to go into effect in March 1958, a unique situation from the command structure level will evolve. A typical example might find the 1st Marine Regiment composed



of the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines; 2d Battalion, 9th Marines and 3d Battalion, 3d Marines.

Administratively, would paper coming or going to the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines be addressed to:

"1st Battalion, 1st Marines/3d Marines, 3d Marine Division?"

Why not redesignate all infantry and artillery battalions (organic to Marine Divisions) as follows?

A) Old Title

1st Marines
1st Bn, 1st Mar
2d Bn, 1st Mar
3d Bn, 1st Mar
2d Marines
1st Bn, 2d Mar
2d Bn, 2d Mar
Etc.

New Title

1st Marines
1st Marine Bn
2d Marine Bn
3d Marine Bn
2d Marines
4th Marine Bn
5th Marine Bn
Etc.

B) Old Title

10th Marines
1st Bn, 10th Mar
2d Bn, 10th Mar
3d Bn, 10th Mar
4th Bn, 10th Mar
11th Marines
1st Bn, 11th Mar
Etc.

New Title

10th Marines
28th Mar
29th Mar
30th Mar
31st Mar
11th Marines
32d Mar
Etc.

Such redesignation would solve many administrative problems which undoubtedly will arise, and would allow free rotation of any such battalion to any such regiment, within the FMF structure of the 3 Marine Divisions. Of course the merits of this must be weighed against the background of morale, history and tradition of the present numbering designation.

Capt J. W. Dion

1st MarDiv
Camp Pendleton, Calif.

Ed: The points raised in Capt Dion's letter were recognized and carefully considered during the planning phase prior to implementation of the Unit Transplacement Program. The administrative advantage of numbering battalions in a consecutive numerical sequence was examined, but was deemed to be outweighed by considerations of the history and traditions associated with the present battalion designations. For this reason it was decided to continue battalions in their traditional designations regardless of physical location or major unit to which attached.

With respect to the question on the correct address of these battalions, the following example will serve as an illustration.

1st Battalion, 1st Marines
3d Marine Division, FMF

From this we note that the battalion is fully identified by its traditional battalion and regimental designators. The division designation clearly identifies the major command with which the battalion is serving.

(Continued on page 8)

Prize Essay Contest

CLASSIFICATIONS

- Group I: Field Grade Officers; Civilians**
- Group II: Company Grade Officers**
- Group III: Enlisted**
- Group IV: Members of the Platoon Leaders Class, Marine Corps Option NROTC, Officer Candidates Class and NAVCADs.**

(Prospective officers may enter Group IV if they have not received their commission at the time the essay is submitted.)

A total of \$2,000.00 will be awarded to the winners of the Marine Corps Association's 1959 Prize Essay Contest. Essays will be judged in the 4 classifications, determined by the status of the contestant (active, inactive or retired member of the Armed Forces of the US and its Allies or as a civilian). A prize of \$500.00 will be awarded to the winner in each group. If no essay entered in the contest is of a sufficiently high standard of excellence, no prize will be awarded in the classification concerned. In the event of a tie, awards may be prorated.

Material dealing with original thinking on military subjects is particularly desired. Historical essays are not solicited unless they can point up some development or far-reaching thought that affects us directly today.

In addition to the prizes awarded, one or more essays may receive "Honorable Mention" and be accepted for publication. Those not receiving a prize or honorable mention may be accepted for general publication in the GAZETTE. Compensation for such articles will be as adjudged by the Editorial Board.

General Rules

1. Contestants may write on any subject of military interest but essays may not exceed 5,000 words and they must be original.
2. They must be typewritten, double-spaced, on paper approximately 8 x 11, and must be submitted in triplicate.
3. The name of the author shall not appear on the essay. Each essay heading shall contain an identifying phrase consisting of the last 5 words of the essay. This phrase shall appear:
 - a) On the title page of the essay.
 - b) On the outside of a sealed envelope containing the name (rank and serial number, if any) of the author.
 - c) Above the name and address of the author, inside the identifying envelope.
4. Essays and identifying envelope must be mailed in a sealed envelope marked Prize Essay Contest Group (I, II, III, IV as appropriate) to the Secretary-Treasurer, Marine Corps Association, Box 1844, Quantico, Virginia.
5. Essays must be received by the Secretary-Treasurer prior to 1 October 1959.

The copyright of any essay which appears in the GAZETTE is the property of the Marine Corps Association. No liability for the loss, return, judging or reports on any essay submitted will be assumed by the Marine Corps Association or the GAZETTE and the decisions of the Editorial Board will be final. No inquiries regarding essays will be answered until final judgment has been made.

DEADLINE 1 OCTOBER 1959

The Marine Corps Association

A Day's Pay

... Some of the most odious and time consuming activities in the Marine Corps are those connected with fund drives, raffles, and other well-intentioned shakedowns with which we are all burdened. The amount of administration, lost man-hours, and virtual begging, involved in these campaigns is no secret.

As a solution, I suggest that every Marine be willing to sign a statement authorizing the disbursing officer to withhold one day's base pay a year (prorated each payday) to be distributed as the Marine desires. The statement would continue in effect for an entire enlistment or, in the case of officers, indefinitely. The amount withheld, ranging from approximately 11 cents a payday for recruits to approximately \$2.37 a payday for generals, would not constitute a hardship to the Marine and I feel sure would result in greater net receipts for the charities.

Coupled with the above program should be an iron-clad stipulation that absolutely no fund-raising campaigns would be permitted on a Marine Corps activity.

After all, for a day's pay we deserve some protection.

2d Bridge Co, FMF
Camp Lejeune, N. C.

1stLt Kent Baylor

Lightning Bugs

... Some additional comments to the excellent article "Night Battalion" by Maj W. J. Davis (GAZETTE: Dec '58).

A large number of otherwise normal men have "chicken blindness," which means they cannot see at night or in the dark. Doctors will certify this fact. Before the start of night training such men should be found out, registered by platoon and company commanders, and during night training should be placed under the guidance of men who can see at night. This will be of much help and prevent hazardous movements and disorder.

In night training, most important are the preliminary steps of night work. Let the men lie on the ground and check what they can see when looking upward. Have them lie on

a slope and have them see and count what passes the crest.

For a successful night operation keep the unit for 24 hours in complete darkness in an old mine or other darkened place. Bring the unit out into action at night.

Avoid use of any kind of light, because it will temporarily blind the men. If you must have light, use the infrared one. For reading orders and reports, catch and keep in small boxes some luminous bugs. With 2 bugs on a paper it can be read easily.

Boris d'Adamovitch Leliwa
Winchester, N.H.

Administrators

... The October 1958 issue of the GAZETTE carried an article by LtCol Bacon in which the author berates administrative officers for setting up and perpetuating what he considers to be unnecessary time-consuming correspondence-routing delays. He suggests that this practice is unnecessary and with few exceptions should be done away with forthwith.

The list of units which have 100% membership in the Marine Corps Association will be continued in the May issue.

He blames this over-emphasis on correspondence-routing checks on administrators who have developed a thin skin regarding pointed remarks from superiors who want papers that can't be found immediately. Farther on in the piece the Colonel lays some small blame on the superior who should be more tolerant in his demands, but he tries to make the point that the main fault lies with the administrators who set up the elaborate defensive measures.

Granted that much of what he says regarding the unnecessary character of a lot of the delay in correspondence handling is true, the fact remains that superiors are not always tolerant. The fact also remains that these same superiors are the reporting seniors for fitness report purposes. There are few adminis-

trative officers, or any other staff officers, who desire to incur the wrath of the boss. Every smart staff officer does his job the way he thinks the CO wants it done, and that includes setting up and maintaining any correspondence-routing procedures.

The only point made by the article is one, well known to all of us, which goes "the commander is ultimately responsible for everything that his unit does or fails to do." If there is fault to find in use of unnecessary delaying tactics in paper shuffling let's put the blame where it belongs. Commanding officers who want no unnecessary delays in routing correspondence have only to exercise their prerogative of command to have it stopped.

Capt G. E. Morrison

3825 Ingalls Ave.
Alexandria, Va.

Got an Answer?

... This comes in the nature of a query rather than a message. Why is there no J company in the Marine Corps, or in the Army either for that matter? As far as I can determine there is also no J street in our nation's capital.

I seem to recall from lore I heard in my earlier "boothood" that the reason J is omitted is as follows: During the Revolution an Army J company mutinied or showed cowardice in the face of the enemy. This unit was subsequently mustered out of the service and stricken from the records. And since that date there has been no J designation.

Another school of thought leans to the theory that J is too similar to I or to A and K in phonetics. I've put a little local research into this question but still have found no definite answer or reference. Perhaps one of the readers can bring to light the answer—with references.

Maj W. C. Doty

Basic School
MCS, Quantico, Va.

Ed: Neither HQMC Historical Branch nor the Marine Corps Museum has an official answer to this question. Both feel, however, that the "mutinous company" story is untrue since the military did have J companies long after the Revolution. The fact that the pronunciation of J is phonetically too close to K, plus the fact that when written J and I may be confused, may be the answer. We would like to hear from our readers who may have some factual information on this question.

**MISSILE
TRACKING**

SEA-LAB



This huge antenna is part of an electronic and optical system that RCA installed and is operating on the S.S. American Mariner. The purpose of the equipment, for which the ship has been refitted, is to provide the most precise data yet obtained at sea on missile flights over a range extending from Cape Canaveral, Fla., to the area of Ascension Island. The project is

sponsored jointly by the Advanced Research Projects Agency, Department of Defense and the Army Ordnance Command. A scientific staff—most of them RCA personnel—will operate the equipment and report on missile performance from descent from space to final plunge, the data to be shared by all branches of the armed services.



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
RADIO CORPORATION of AMERICA

DEFENSE ELECTRONIC PRODUCTS
CAMDEN, N. J.



the SECURITY of STABILITY

By LtCol Dennis D. Nicholson



HONORABLE MENTION — GROUP I

“STRATEGY, TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE are changing rapidly under the impact of new developments, but men—and the spirit that animates them—are still the heart and soul of all fighting services.” So wrote Hanson W. Baldwin, noted military and naval analyst, in *The New York Times* recently.

The “fightingest” service in the world, the US Marine Corps, has long espoused this precept. In years gone by, the Corps has been uniquely successful in accentuating the kind of spirit that inspires men to wrest victory from seemingly hopeless situations.

On a comparative basis, today’s Corps is still performing well the task of maintaining high morale and esprit. But *comparative* is not good enough when we are hovering on the brink of one limited war after another, when the specter of

unlimited war is an ever-present threat, and when thoughtful citizens look to the Corps not only as the nation’s, but as the free world’s, force-in-readiness.

In the face of this profound responsibility, the Marine Corps has developed a body of modern amphibious doctrine which gives a new dimension to free world strategy. In 1958 the Fleet Marine Forces completed an almost total reorganization in order to attain forces that are finely and perfectly balanced to employ this newly-developed doctrine. New weapons and equipment are progressively assimilated into the FMF, and the complementing tactics and techniques, developed at Marine Corps Schools, are adopted as the new equipment is phased in.

That is a comforting (and accurate) word picture of a vibrant, lethal force-in-readiness. It leaves out

only one element: men. That is fatal, because, as Adm Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, said in August 1958, “Only men can win battles.” While the other elements of this force-in-readiness are new, men—and the esprit that motivates them—have not changed significantly since Adam.

This poses certain problems. To avoid them, the Marine Corps is impelled to cultivate within its ranks an atmosphere in which all factors that materially affect the spirit that animates men can be enhanced. Otherwise, the Corps may face the situation Secretary of the Navy Thomas S. Gates described in a 1958 Armed Forces Day address. He said, “. . . we have been plagued by breakdowns in manpower upon whom we must depend.”

Security of stability is a comprehensive factor which, if properly

developed, will absolutely prevent significant manpower breakdown. No type of security—not even financial security—can hold a candle to stability as the security that attracts men to a service career and then inspires their best effort. This stability means a steadfastness of character within the Corps—the kind of purposeful equilibrium which causes men to feel secure.

In today's Corps this stable security would mean that a Marine could look forward to the probability that his CO would be the same officer next year and the year after. He would never get the feeling that he existed primarily to act as a training aid for qualifying new platoon, company, battery, battalion or squadron commanders.

It would mean he could count on serving with the same squad members for at least a couple of years. This would make him impervious to the stress and strain of deploying to a forward area. He would be at home in the service with the same "family" regardless of where his unit might be sent.

It would mean that he would know where to "fall in" when assembly sounded. He would know the people on either side of him, and he would know what kind of drill he would perform. There would be no worrying about whether he would march off for LPM drill, 8-

man squad drill, or 13-man squad drill.

It would mean that he would know what the uniform-of-the-day would be all day tomorrow and on the same day the following year. He would not have to worry about the possibility that a recent uniform change had made part of his uniform obsolete.

It would mean that he could calmly rest assured that the internal character of his Corps was a lasting, unchanging thing.

In short, the security of stability means that every Marine belongs to a stable organization to which he can unreservedly dedicate himself. Dedication is the key to the kind of spirit that is essential to an elite, nuclear-age force-in-readiness. Coach Bowden Wyatt of the University of Tennessee put the thought in a nutshell in a statement made for *LOOK* Magazine of 16 September 1958: "Our Tennessee cheerleaders . . . make a pretty picture of football spirit. But spirit to the player means dedication." No team and no service can maintain the spirit that animates men to win (games or battles) without real dedication of its individual members.


By creating the security of stability within the service and thereby evolving something to which a man can readily dedicate himself, any

possibility of morale (and therefore manpower) breakdown will be precluded. The Marine Corps, secure in the knowledge that the probability of such a morale breakdown in the Corps is remote, could be complacent about the subject. It cannot afford, however, to take this attitude.

Since the Corps is and always has been a David-like fighting unit that stands in readiness to engage Goliath-like enemies, it must today invoke unprecedented dedication on the part of its members.

In a broad sense the Marine Corps can achieve the security of stability—and thereby ensure total dedication of its Marines—by the simple process of minimizing change. Change is currently an American fetish; so it is audacious, if not sacrilegious, to suggest that all change is not inherently improvement. However, there is no denying that excessive change is detrimental, or that the whirl of change within the Corps must be counterchecked if stability is to prevail.

In the civilian community there is an almost frenzied trend toward change that sometimes seems to be change merely for the sake of change. Families are busy moving from town to the suburbs and then back to an apartment in town. More and more companies are transferring personnel over the country (if



not the world) in a manner similar to the military. Whole cities are becoming transient neighborhoods. Fashions, fads, entertainment trends, practically everything is in a constant state of flux or changed on regularly predictable cycles.


It was perhaps inevitable that some of this national mania for change would pervade the Marine Corps if only by osmosis. It has. This is manifest by a busybodyism that is slowly permeating the Corps, implanting a crescendo of change as it spreads.

Changes wrought by eager-beaver staff officers and commanders should not, on face value, be viewed as betterment until proved to be. President Millard Fillmore saw the danger in excessive change at the hand of individuals who were more industrious than intelligent. In his third annual address (6 December, 1852) he said, "It is not strange . . . that such an exuberance of enterprise should cause some individuals to mistake change for progress. . . ."

In the current fast-moving national psychology few individuals are able to get their roots down to give themselves stability. The sociologists and psychiatrists know, though, that this stability, if it could be attained, would cure most of the ills in human relations, and that it is essential to any sustained sense of well-being.

The Marine Corps is strikingly well equipped to provide an island of stability in the sea of change that characterizes America today. This is because the Corps almost inherently has something of the home-in-the-service philosophy about it. Furthermore, the Corps' constant emphasis on treating Marines as individuals provides a good foundation on which to build stability.

This article is no plea for a backward march into the past, nor for marking time to await stagnation. Certain change is absolutely essential. In the field of administration, for example, it is apparent that old procedures must give way to new ones that take advantage of new management tools such as electronic data processing computers and other modern business machines. Everyone knows that strategy, tactics, techniques, weapons and equipment,



LtCol Nicholson enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1938 and was commissioned in 1942. Among various assignments during the past 20 years, have been: CO, MD, USS Monterey; Enlisted Performance Division, HQMC; PIO, NERD & SERD; Secretary, MCLFDC, Quantico; Chief, Editorial and Manuals Sections, MCLFDC, Quantico; MCLFDC Liaison Officer, FMFPac; S3 2/7 & 3/7. He is a graduate of Junior School and has served as Head, Press Branch, Division of Information, HQMC.

must be changed more and more rapidly as technology changes the whole complexion of warfare. Navy Department General Order 21 points out that, "The more powerful the weapons that science gives us, the more important the character and will of the men behind them." A Marine colonel who discussed the subject with this writer recently put it this way, "What we need is stability without stagnation."

Technological advances in equipment and the development of doctrine, tactics and techniques to exploit them, in no way preclude the maintenance of stability within the Corps. In fact, as science provides the weapons that dictate these changes, we must increase proportionately our efforts to stabilize the men who employ the new weapons. The more complex the weapons become, the more intensely must we strive for the security of stability.

There are many areas in which the Marine Corps must stabilize. Foremost among them is the achievement of optimum personnel stability, and any program to engender security of stability within the Corps will of necessity have this as a primary objective.

The Commandant of the Marine Corps recognized this fact and in May 1958 convened a board, headed by a general officer, to recommend ways and means of achieving the desired personnel stability [See "Personnel Readiness" *GAZETTE*, Dec. '58]. The report of this board has not been published at this writing, but its recommendations will doubtless lay the groundwork for solving this one facet of present-day instability.

Since WWII, and especially since Korea, increasing commitments dictated by higher authority, procurement of officers for short-term tours of active duty, short-term enlistments, low reenlistment rates, harsh

criteria for overseas eligibility, and heavy school quotas have combined to turn the Marine Corps into a veritable personnel merry-go-round.

This accelerated personnel turnover developed so slowly, over such a long period of time, and has been with us so long that we have become callous to it. In too many quarters the squirrel cage effect of personnel spinning from one unit to the next has been accepted as a fact of life. In recent MAREX's, for example, thousands of paper transfers had to be effected before alerted units were brought up to strength with personnel eligible for overseas deployment. This was patent personnel instability. However, units concerned were so accustomed to this treadmill method of personnel management that they reported "No major personnel problems encountered."

In August 1957 when Corps strength was 203,942, an astounding total of 132,955 personnel changes was reported. That is 1,000 fewer than the number reported for August a year earlier. This is, of course, an extreme example of the volume of personnel changes, because August is an exceptionally high-turnover month. These totals include internal unit changes as well as PCS transfers and detachments.

In addition to the external factors that contribute to personnel instability, the Marine Corps has on its own generated an internal practice that speeds the rat race of personnel turnover. This is the practice of quickly rotating commanders so that the largest possible number of officers get a chance to command. Apparently this trend was started by Paragraph 7059.2, Marine Corps Manual, which states, "... reassignment of relatively inexperienced officers among the various billets must be regarded as a training requirement by all commanders." The

Manual states that a minimum of six months and a maximum of one year is appropriate for such tours.

The idea of rapid rotation of commanders caught on quickly with division commanders and permeated the Corps in no time at all. A recent survey at Headquarters, Marine Corps revealed that for every officer PCS ordered by the Commandant, there are 3 additional changes of assignment within the unit. This practice was attractive because it seemed to offer equal opportunity to officers—at least to a larger percentage than would otherwise be possible. It appeared to fit right in with our old "Band of Brothers" concept of the officer corps. It developed, though, that this policy was unwarranted obsession with dividing the plum of command, and it turned all too many units into a Band of *Boarders* who had no sense of belonging.

Anyway, there is an element of

decision, to take pride in its success or take the blame for its failure." The Admiral, incidentally, thinks a 2-year tour is much, much too brief to accomplish this.

Short tours of duty for commanders are terribly rough on the troops. They hardly learn the name of one commander before another replaces him. They naturally infer that the training of commanders is important, but that unit integrity is not. It is like trying to make a family feel, act and function as a family, when there is a new father every 4 months. The atmosphere that fosters the security of stability can prevail only when the commander is at least a semi-permanent fixture.

The feeling of the troops about the practice of constantly changing commanders is evident in a current story. Two FMF privates are working alongside a road when they spot an approaching jeep. It has a lieutenant colonel passenger, and the

cludes those factors which create instability at command levels. An endless change of battalion and squadron commanders, transfers of company, battery and platoon commanders, and a succession of section and squad leaders do not contribute to a stable, cohesive and combat ready command."

In May 1958 a senior lieutenant colonel writing to a friend at Headquarters, Marine Corps put it like this: "If I were Commandant, my first move would be to impose a one-year moratorium on transfers involving command billets—from platoon leader to general officer billets.

"I have been on Okinawa a little more than a year, and I am now dealing with the third CG for the 3d MarDiv, the third Chief of Staff, the third G-4. Surely the 3d MarDiv is an exception; however, the 1st MarDiv was nearly as bad. As a platoon leader for little more than a year in 1941-'42, I can still remember my squad leaders' names; as a battalion commander for the 'six-month' tour in 1956, I have to strain to recall my company commanders' names because they came and went so quickly."

Only a few Marine Corps units can now boast of anything approaching security of stability. Perhaps the nearest thing to it prevails in aviation squadrons that are designated for unit rotation under the imaginative and efficient Marine aviation squadron rotation plan. The technical term used for preparing a squadron for rotation is to "stabilize" it. This means that its personnel are "frozen" in the squadron.

It has been proved that the stabilized squadrons really provide the secure effect that is desperately needed in all Marine Corps units. Proponents of the aviation plan claim that they have gone beyond unit stability and achieved "unit tranquility."

A Marine colonel from the Division of Aviation, Headquarters, Marine Corps, was giving a briefing on the squadron rotation plan. Someone interrupted to ask if this plan didn't hinder equal distribution of squadron command assignments to all officers in the wing. He replied that it did, and then he added, "We are working to make a ready Ma-



unfairness in these super-short tours for commanders. The incoming commander may get credit for a fine job done by his predecessor; or he may get blamed for his predecessor's errors before he has a chance to take corrective action. VAdm Hyman G. Rickover, speaking of Navy officer assignments, summed up the point in *Life Magazine* on 8 September, 1958: "A man should stay in place long enough to see the fruit of his

back seat is full of personal gear. Obviously this is the new battalion commander. One Marine says to the other, "Stand by, Mac, here's where we get snapped out of our stuff again."

In "A Tocsin for Command" (*GAZETTE*, April 1958) LtCol Henry H. Reichner, Jr., cites this practice as one of the real enemies of stability. He writes, "Instability as an enemy of our command structure in-

rine Corps and not to train every officer to make general."

There is no doubt that such a philosophy will benefit the Marine Corps in the long run. Without it, we cannot expect to develop fully the concept of security of stability. The one danger of such a philosophy—that it will adversely affect promotion potential for many officers—is less a danger than it appears to be. Promotion boards will recognize the reduced opportunity for command and compensate for it, once the Corps officially slows the flow of officers into and out of command assignments.

As a corollary to limiting command changes, the Division of Aviation unit rotation plan should be extended to as many FMF units as possible; both ground and air. Other units will automatically become more stable when this is done. Then, this advance toward stability must be complemented by increased efforts to lengthen enlistments and to increase active duty tours for officers. And we should work to achieve an all-professional officer corps at the earliest possible date.

Once these steps are taken the major hurdle to establishing the security of stability will have been cleared. Traditional Marine Corps leadership techniques will exert themselves, the father-son relationships between the commander and his men will prevail, and that will automatically create a home-in-the-service atmosphere with attendant stability in which every man can feel secure if not serene.

After the high hurdle is negotiated, there are several low ones that must be attempted. These hurdles exist because, as we have already seen, the national urge to change has made some inroads into the Corps. Some of our aggressive staff officers constantly search for something that can be changed. Often it seems that changes are recommended by a staff officer with but one purpose in mind—to attract attention to himself and thereby add to his personal reputation.

New commanders often feel it necessary to change everything in sight on the theory that the unit should reflect the personality of the commander. If the signs are painted scarlet and gold when he reports aboard, he prefers them in black

and white. If the troops are wearing camouflage covers green side out, he prefers them brown. This sort of illogic can be—and sometimes is—extended into every nook and cranny of the unit and thereby creates utter chaos each time such a commander takes over.

An example of changes dreamed up by staff officers is the plan to change the names of the various outlying camps within Camp Pendleton. These camp sites had colorful Spanish names in 1942 when the Corps acquired the Rancho Santa Margarita, and promptly renamed it Camp Pendleton. This was the first change in the name of the area since it was christened by followers of Don Carper de Portola two centuries earlier. The names of outlying camps were redesignated as Tent Camps 1, 2, 3, etc. In later years, however, someone decided to resurrect the old names. So a command-wide program was initiated to refer to the camps only by their Spanish names. This campaign was largely successful.



About 8 years after this campaign, though, some bright staff officer decided that the outlying camp names should be changed to the names of Marine Medal of Honor winners and this is now being implemented. For example, Camp Del Mar will become Camp Kraus, and Camp Las Flores will become Camp McCard.

Changing camp names is an illustration of the minor factors that combine to destroy any atmosphere of permanence. In the Marine Corps the recruit should be able to absorb Corps lore from the sea stories spun by old salts. As he makes the far-away places and strange-sounding names part of his knowledge of the Corps, he begins to feel that he belongs to the fraternity of Leather-necks because of the vicarious experience he acquires.

A recruit used to sit around the squad bay listening to old salts talk about rickshaw races down Bubbling Well Road in Shanghai. Pretty soon the recruit was talking about Bubbling Well Road as if he, too, had stood in a rickshaw, fair-leather

belt in hand, threatening to clobber the coolie if his rickshaw wasn't the first to reach the main gate.

Think how deflated the recruit would have been, when he finally got to the China Station, if he found that Bubbling Well Road had been renamed Sergeant Koblinsky Parkway in honor of a Medal of Honor winner. Besides, it is a dubious honor to an individual to name a camp for him. The ravages of time and the fluctuating budget may turn the place into a run-down, ill-kept area in a few, short years.

Aside from the expense of changing the signs and requiring a great deal of paperwork, not to mention the work of the staff who dreamed up the change, such changes gnaw away at the stability that the Corps needs in today's turbulent world.

Changes in drill regulations have done a great deal of damage to stability in the Corps during the past few years. The reasons are obvious. The Corps must settle on one drill for all hands, adopt it, and stick to it.

The troops continue to be harassed by changes in uniform. For a number of years now uniform changes have been compounded until we are now changing the changes. Nevertheless, uniforms are not markedly improved over the ones Marines wore at the beginning of WWII. Orders announcing changes in uniform still emanate from Headquarters, Marine Corps regularly. The last one announced 13 changes. This is a real enemy of stability and should be minimized, if, indeed, it can't be stopped. All uniform changes should be suspended for a 4-year period. This is a drastic step.



However, it is the kind of bold thinking and action that is required if we are to create the security of stability to which every Marine can dedicate his career.

Only a few examples of changes that destroy stability without offer-


ing a compensatory advantage have been enumerated. The reader can readily call to mind many more. Some substantially affect stability. Others merely harass. A constant flow of either type of change will keep units in a state of shock, cause individuals to wonder if Corps planners know what they are doing, and destroy any sense of stability.

The importance of stability is so great that every officer and non-commissioned officer who conceives of a change, be it ever so minor, should analyze it carefully to ensure that it is essential and that it won't tear down the security of stability that may be building. Change for change's sake and change to draw attention to the changer must cease.

When the Corps puts the brakes on the whirling dervish of change that today threatens to embroil the organization, it will not fall on its face like a gyroscope that ceases to revolve. Instead, the momentum that has been spent going round and round in cycles of change will be turned into steady progress along the long, straight line that leads to success in battle. This success will be achieved by Marines who have found the Marine Corps an ideal to dedicate themselves to, because it offers the security of stability.

The Secretary of the Navy recently said, "Strength comes from many sources. Most of all, it is deep within man himself." By cultivating the security of stability, the Corps will bring out the inner strength of its Marines, weld it into an unprecedented esprit de corps, and thus prepare itself for even more illustrious service than the glories of its past.

USMC



Saintly Behavior

☛ ONE SUNDAY MORNING AT CAMP LEJEUNE, a car passed me and I was making the maximum speed. A siren wailed and an MP sped by in hot pursuit. On 2 wheels the first car turned in at the Catholic Chapel, where an extremely attractive girl got out and smiled sweetly at the irate MP.

"Are you late for Mass, too?" she asked as she hurried into the chapel.

Col W. F. Prickett

Don't Need None Nohow

☛ WHILE A GUNNERY SERGEANT CERTAINLY influences his people, winning friends in the process sometimes can be difficult, a fact readily recognizable to young impressionable minds.

Recently my son, age 9, visited an aircraft carrier at the local shipyard. When he returned home his mother asked whether his trip had in any way changed his plans for the future.

"Oh, no," he replied. "I'm still going to be a Marine like daddy."

"How about you?" my wife asked our 6-year-old.

"Me, too," he said. "I'm going to be a gunny sergeant, just like daddy."

"Oh?" said my wife.

"Yes," he answered, "I don't want any friends either."

AGySgt H. R. Schramm

Marine Corps Gazette • April 1959

KŌGUN THE JAPANESE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC WAR

The MCA will soon publish *KŌGUN, The Japanese Army in the Pacific War* by Saburo Hayashi. Here we present the foreword to the book, written by Dr. Alvin D. Coox.

FOREWORD

☛ **DEFEAT COMES EASY TO NO PEOPLE.** For the proud men of *Yamato*, the denouement of 1945 was particularly incomprehensible. With their long, mystical and divine dialectic, the Japanese sensed that the ending must be malcontrived, since the outcome was supposedly preordained. They had never once tasted the bitter dregs of defeat in modern times, although the foes they had vanquished included such latter-day giants as Imperial China, Czarist Russia and the Kaiser's Germany. When at last they themselves were visited with nuclear hells, the searing finale to their agony was not entirely out of context in massive horror and shocking impact.

Over the radio in mid-August 1945 came the unexpected words of the Emperor, stunning in their import: "... according to the dictates of time and fate, we have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all generations to come, by enduring the unendurable and suf-

fering the insufferable." Across the arch of five decades floated back the famous phraseology of the Emperor Meiji, from the time of the Triple Intervention of 1895. . . . Now there was only silence and a numb void, empty of hope and illusion. The undertones were complex and varied, commixtures of rage and indignation, mortification and fear, despair and relief.

Off Tokyo Bay rode a new Black Ship, *Missouri*, not *Susquehanna* as in Perry's day. The Old Testament book of Samuel describes a comparable situation well: "How are the mighty fallen!" Little thought now for the brittle years when Star and Japan dominated East Asia. Success had long been the glittering promise, but the cruel reward was abysmal military bankruptcy. Defeat was a raw, ugly, and unaccustomed word, which grated on nerves already frayed by nightmares of terror borne from the skies. To put it

simply, Japan preferred the refuge of amnesia. Or, as General Otozo Yamada, the last commander of the ill-fated Kwantung Army, ruefully put it: "Defeated generals should not talk of battles."

At last the 1940's drew to a close; midcentury was at hand. Japanese instincts of dynamic industry and indefatigable cleanliness triumphed over lassitude and squalor, characteristics which had never marked the better days, the lost years. Embers still twinkled amidst the ashes; Japan dared hope again. And, with hope, crept back the past, its uglier aspects glossed over, its miseries dulled by time and by newly found prosperity. Of this phenomenon, Emerson remarked long ago, "Time dissipates to shining ether the solid angularity of facts."

Soon a forgotten or ill-remembered word, "Victory," dared be confronted once more; no longer was the word the monopoly of transitory occupiers. The nadir was indeed past. From the shadows emerged wraiths of yesteryear, forgotten heroes of domestic chronicles, of the wars fought and won at the turn of the century. Had not the tragic old Premier, Admiral Kantaro Suzuki (whom some had even irreverently called a "Badoglio"), once led Japanese destroyers to victory over the Russians in 1905? Were not those Russians of the same breed which wore incongruously sparkling "Socialistic" epaulets aboard the U.S.S. *Missouri*, and which overran Manchuria in borrowed Studebaker trucks? The wheel was finally turning full circle.

The Shin Toho studios gauged the public pulse remarkably well when they brought out the highly successful film entitled *Meiji Tenno to Nichiro Dai Senso* (Emperor Meiji and the Russo-Japanese War) in 1957. Encouraged by their success, they immediately followed it up with an earlier period piece, *Meiji Tenno Kogo Ryoheika to Nisshin Senso* (Emperor Meiji, The Empress, and the Sino-Japanese War), which appeared in 1958. That same year, the relatively best of the Japanese documentaries to come out of the second World War was released: *Taiheiyo Senki* (History of the Pacific War). Critics have called this intelligently selected film "a real documentary, instead of the

usual collection of newsreel snippets or the so-called 'documentaries' which showed every battle up to the time that the tide began to turn against Japan."

Like the publishers, the movie men knew that a new generation was going to school now, a generation which scarcely remembered the terrifying banshees' wail of air raid sirens, and the raging flames of incendiary death. The teenagers of the 1950's (together with many sheerly nostalgic elders) flocked to the bookstalls to devour now-mushrooming war magazines. As early as November 1955, the widely read *Bungei Shunju* probably set off the "boom" with a special issue entitled "Final [sic] Account of the Japanese Army and Navy," the cover adorned with the photographs of six top wartime military and naval leaders. In the years that followed, *Bungei Shunju* published many more special issues, as did *Chisei*, *Konnichi-no Wadai*, *Nippon Shuho*, *Shukan Sankei*, *Shukan Yomiuri*, and *Sunday Nippon*.

In the rather spectacular instance of the new periodical *Maru*, even its own editor admitted surprise at his magazine's almost overnight success starting in 1956. "We did not really expect this fad to last long," confessed Hajime Takagi, "but we soon discovered that we had a steady following of very serious-minded readers. So we too decided to get serious about it and put out a better magazine." There was now no dearth of materials submitted by former officers and enlisted men of the old Imperial armed forces. Riding the crest with its competitors, *Maru* doubled its size—and its price; circulation soared. Special supplement followed special supplement.

Letters to the editors poured in, especially from the youngsters. A 15-year-old from Tokyo wrote that he "loved war stories" and wanted to read newspaper accounts from the war years, about which he knew next to nothing. A 17-year-old from Kyoto wrote:

"I think the Japanese today lack a national consciousness. They admire everything that's imported. We should realize what we Japanese are capable of; the best means would be to show the fine performances the

Japanese armed forces gave. It is not to fan jingoism; but to know the truth would be the first step toward peace, I think."

In the same vein, a 19-year old from Tochigi said:

"Reading the Special Navy Supplement, I realized for the first time that Japan once had a mighty Navy. This was a wonderful experience for a person like me, who has known so very little about the old Navy. I hope that you will continue to publish books and magazines concerning military affairs, which are not very well known at all."

By catering to juvenile—or reminiscent—popular taste, the commercial publishers inevitably tended to stress dramatic superficiality, lurid narrative, and masochism. Thus the important *Bungei Shunju* (whose "lead" was previously mentioned) brought out, in August 1955, Hiroshi Akiyama's "*Saikin Sen wa Jumbi Sareteita!*" (Bacteriological Warfare Preparations Were Already Complete!). In this grisly article, Akiyama described in revolting detail his alleged experiences with the infamous Unit 731, the Army's "murder machine" stationed in Manchuria. His ostensible purpose: "To help in some small measure to warn people against the horrors of a third World War, and to prevent such horrors from occurring."

The Akiyama piece stirred up violent controversy concerning its very *raison d'être*. An even more violent reaction attended the publication in March 1957 of the book entitled *San Ko* (Three Lights). This gory volume, which described the appalling atrocities committed by Japanese in occupied China, became an immediate best-seller, with some 50,000 copies bought up in the first two weeks following publication. Suddenly, however, the book was withdrawn from the stands, reportedly as the result of intense pressure brought to bear upon the publisher by incensed Rightist elements. The whole problem came to life again in August 1958, when a certain veterans' group (the so-called "Liaison Council of Returnees from China") got another publisher to republish the controversial book (in expanded form) under a new title, *Shinryaku* (Invasion). Acting on

the complaint of the original publisher, a Tokyo district court issued an interlocutory injunction prohibiting republication and sale of the book.

While some Japanese were seeking to expiate their sins, to propagandize, or to "entertain" with painful but commercially profitable now-it-can-be-told confessions, others were devising a new rationale. Had the noble souls enshrined in Yasukuni Jinja departed this life in vain? Did not genius, sacrifice, and even beauty sparkle in direst defeat? Was there not "humanistic glory and loveliness," plus simple manly virtue in war's own forge of evil? The Japanese soldier and sailor, after all, had proved not unworthy of the Emperor in battle, but had instead been overwhelmed by material technology and a lavish logistical abundance which the four fair isles of *Hongoku* could ill afford. This was the school which thought, like Havelock Ellis perhaps, that "Defeat brings prudence and concentration; it ennobles and fortifies."

With the emptying of Sugamo Prison in 1958, much of the emotional resentment against the International Military Tribunal's judgments of "war guilt" may now be spent, although there appears to be a mounting agitation for the pardon of all so-called Class "B" and "C" prisoners, now released on parole. The Buddhist chaplain Shincho Hanayama, however, had already done much to "humanize" the more famous Class "A" war criminals, in his book translated as *The Way of Deliverance* (1950). Among the most interesting of Hanayama's notes is the record of his interviews with former General Iwane Matsui, in December 1948. Speaking of his old military teachers (Arao, Kawakami, Fukushima, Aoki and Utsunomiya), Matsui had asserted:

"In these men there was nothing of the cut-throat or highwayman type such as has developed in the Army recently, with the rise of militarism. These fathers of the Japanese Army, living up to all that could be expected of them, were really filled with the spirit of the Emperor Meiji. Later, the whole nation underwent a change, and I believe it was the young ones, acting im-

petuously and without restraint, who finally brought everything to the present pass."

In commenting upon the disgrace of Nanking, for example, Matsui said that the Japanese Government, "most likely, did not appreciate the fact, but a great change had taken place [since the days of the Russo-Japanese War] in matters like *bushido* and humanity." Concluded Matsui: "After things turned out this way, I am really eager to die at any time."

More recently, Okinori Kaya, wartime Finance Minister (who was, significantly enough, elected to the Lower House during the national elections of May 1958), wrote in *Nippon Shuho*:

"I believe that the Greater East Asia War was not premeditated by Japan. I believe that the war broke out by force of circumstances during the China Incident. It was not like the war which the Nazis started after painstaking planning. . . . [The Japanese people nowadays] speak ill of exsoldiers, but the latter are not the ones who started the war. Nor are they responsible for Japan's defeat; it was not because they were lax that Japan lost the war. It is indeed regrettable that they should be criticized, just because Japan lost the war."

Former-Colonel Takushiro Hatori has "re-evaluated" Japan's wartime armed forces. In *Bungei Shunju's* special issue of March 1956, he observed that the Japanese Army had had "no peer in its terrific fighting capacity, which is quite apart from the fact that Japan lost the war."

In the teeth of the new trend, some articulate critics have spoken up. For example, the big daily newspaper *Yomiuri Shimbun*, in an editorial appearing as early as April 16, 1956, warned that there had already emerged a plethora of "uncritical romanticizations" of the Greater East Asia War, lacking historical or sociological perspective, while stimulating a hollow belligerency. Two years later, the same newspaper wryly observed that "Japanese former soldiers are busy seeking pensions; when it comes to problems of war, their ideology scarcely differs from what it was in

the old days."

Mature Japanese of objectivity and integrity would, in this broader view, seek to master the past, not be enslaved by it. They would be, one might surmise, the intellectual kin of the late James Forrestal, who had said while the Second World War was still fresh in the minds of the victors:

"It is no reflection upon the character or the ability of the men who directed the prosecution of the recent war to acknowledge that mistakes were made. Rather is it evidence of their integrity that they should promptly call attention to those errors and propose corrective measures.

. . . If we are to plan wisely for our future security we must measure all proposals against two standards: What weaknesses revealed by World War II should be corrected? What new dangers must we anticipate and guard against? The first test of any plan for future national security is the extent to which it applies these lessons of the past. Any plan which neglects this requirement is misconceived. Any plan which fails to meet this requirement must be judged inadequate."

Saburo Hayashi is one knowledgeable Japanese who has devoted much thought to the meaningful questions asked by men like Forrestal. Born in 1904, Hayashi was graduated with the 37th Class from Japan's prewar Military Academy in 1925, and went on to become an expert on the system and the regime which tantalizes the West's best brains today: Soviet Russia. After a number of years of troop duty, he was graduated from the War College in 1934. Assigned to the Russian Intelligence Section of the General Staff's Second Bureau in 1935, he was next sent to the Soviet Union and Poland in 1938 as a language officer. The following year he was appointed Assistant Military Attaché in Moscow. In 1940 he returned to IGHQ's Russian Section, which he eventually took over as Chief in 1943. Promoted to the rank of Colonel in 1944, he subsequently assumed charge of the IGHQ Operations Bureau's Organization and Mobilization Section (June 1944). At

a time which was highly critical for Japan, in April 1945, he became Military Secretary to the *Minister of War*, General Korechika Anami. He served that tragic historical personage until Anami's suicide immediately following the capitulation in August 1945.

From over five years of research and relentless soul-searching, as well as from his unique personal experience and former vantage point on the Imperial General Staff, emerged this book. Forthrightly and frankly, pulling no punches, he has told the story of the backgrounds and the actualities, from darkness to illusory light and back into darkness. There is no moralizing, no recrimination. The style is bold and clear, no mean feat within the semantic constrictions of Japanese ideographic expression. Equally impressive is his handling, within one incisive volume, of the major problems of the entire turbulent era lying between Meiji and *Missouri*. There is still no other brief analysis and chronicle quite like it in Japanese (or in English, for that matter)—as any serious student of the literature must soon discover to his chagrin. Hayashi's Preface, taken without change from the original Japanese edition, clearly summarizes his reasons for writing the book in the first place. No non-Japanese (and probably few Japanese) could have provided his insights.

Since Hayashi wrote the book for strictly Japanese consumption, it is no fawning apologia to Japan's wartime enemies, no vituperative iconoclasm, no whitewash. Hayashi is not ashamed to have served the Emperor as an officer of the Imperial Army to the best of his abilities. Unlike many of his more parochial colleagues, however, he is acutely interested in the geopolitics, economics, domestic affairs, and over-all strategy which shaped prewar Japanese militarism. He studies World War II combat operations only for lessons and chronology, not for journalistic detail, which is not here the purpose of his trained professional eye. The result has been a finely honed study, which fully deserves American attention, especially within the setting of the post-war rearmament of Japan as an anchor against the spread of world Communism in Asia. USMC



FITNESS REPORTING

some adverse remarks...

By Col R. D. Heinl, Jr.

"This officer is conscientious
and through. . . ."

— Anon. fitness report

☛ IS YOUR NEXT FITNESS REPORT OF interest to you? Are you vaguely dissatisfied with the present fitness report and some of its ground rules? Do you hold strong views and enjoy arguments? Are you in the middle of a "hump" and facing selection before too long?

If your answer is "Yes" to any of the foregoing questions — keep on reading.

The subject of this article is fitness reports and officer evaluation.

Like uniforms, fitness reports

fascinate everybody because they are so individual yet so universal. In addition to being interesting to you and me, however, fitness reports are vitally important to the Marine Corps as a whole, because they provide the principal means of comparison between officers, and thus form the basis for promotion and detail. Since getting promoted at regular intervals, and being sent where you want to go, are among the most satisfying aspects of a service career, you can readily see that the subject of fitness reports is a live one.

Curiously enough, the fitness re-

port antedates promotion by selection by many years. Although probably not exactly so intended, the first Marine "fitness report" on record dates from April 1799 — a letter report by Capt Daniel Carmick to Lieutenant Colonel Commandant Burrows, as follows:

"Lt Amory is very ignorant of Military duty, as he acknowledges, but he is a smart Gentleman and far preferable to the others."

Another early report—and a gem in its own right—is the Army's first recorded efficiency report, submitted during the War of 1812, by Lewis Cass, from the Northwest Territory:

Lower Seneca Town,
August 15th, 1813

Sir:

I forward a list of the officers of the 27th Regt. of Inftry. arranged agreeably to rank. Annexed thereto you will find all the observations I deem necessary to make.

Respectfully,
I am, Sir,
Yo. Obt. Servt.
/s/ LEWIS CASS
Brig. Gen.

27TH INFANTRY REGIMENT

Alex Denniston—Lieut. Col., Comdg.	A Good natured man.
Clarkson Crolins—First Major	A good man, but no officer.
Jesse D. Wadsworth—2nd Major	An excellent officer.
Captain Christian Martel	All good officers.
Captain Aaron T. Crane	
Capt Benj. Wood	
Captain Maxwell	
Captain Shotwell	A man of whom all unite in speaking ill. A knave despised by all.
Captain Allen Reynolds	An officer of capacity, but imprudent and a man of most violent passions.
Captain Danl. Warren Porter	Stranger but little known in the regiment.
First Lieut. Jas. Kerr	Merely good, nothing promising.
First Lieut. Thos. Darling	
First Lieut. Wm. Perrin	Low vulgar men, with exception of Perrin. Irish and from the meanest walks of life — Possessing nothing of the character of officers or gentlemen.
First Lieut. Danl. Scott	
First Lieut. Jas. I. Ryan	
First Lieut. Robt. McElwrath	
First Lieut. Robt. P. Ross	Willing enough — has much to learn — with small capacity.
First Lieut. Hall	Not joined the regiment.
2nd Lieut. Nicholas G. Carner	A good officer but drinks hard and disgraces himself and the service.
2nd Lieut. Stewart Elder	An ignorant unoffending Irishman.
2nd Lieut. McConkey	Raised from the ranks, ignorant, vulgar, and incompetent.
2nd Lieut. Piercy	Come from the ranks, but all behave well and promise to make excell. officers.
2nd Lieut. Jacob J. Brown	
2nd Lieut. Thos. G. Spicer	
2nd Lieut. Oliver Vance	
2nd Lieut. James Garry	A stranger in the regiment.
Third Lieut. Royal Geer	All Irish, promoted from the ranks, low vulgar men, without any one qualification to recommend them, more fit to carry the hod than the epaulettes.
Third Lieut. Meers	
Third Lieut. Clifford	
Third Lieut. Crawford	
Third Lieut. McKeon	Promoted from the ranks, behave well and will make good officers.
Third Lieut. John G. Scholotz	
Third Lieut. Francis T. Wheeler	Just joined the regiment — of fine appearance.
Third Lieut. Darrow	The very dregs of the earth. Unfit for anything under heaven. God only knows how the poor thing got an appointment.
Ensign Behan	Promoted from the ranks — men of no manner and no promise.
Ensign John Brown	From the ranks. A good young man who does well.
Ensign Bryan	
Ensign Charles West	



Entering the Marine Corps from Yale University, **Col Heinl** fought at Pearl Harbor and served in the south and central Pacific, including Iwo Jima and the occupation of Japan. He was successively naval gunfire officer of the 3d MarDiv, the V Amphibious Corps, and FMFPac. In Korea he commanded the UN-held East Coast Islands and was subsequently executive officer of the 11th Marines. He is currently Chief, Naval Mission to Haiti.

Except for such spontaneous effusions as this, the idea of systematic fitness reporting lay dormant until about 1890. The earliest mention of Marine Corps and Navy fitness reports appears in *Navy Regulations, 1893*, Article 237. At this time, and for 2 decades to come, the Marine Corps used the Navy form. The oldest known Marine report of this type was rendered on 1stLt George Barnett, then serving aboard *USS Iroquois* in 1891. As befitted a future Commandant, Barnett got a good report.

One of the last official acts of Major General Commandant George F. Elliott was to approve in 1910 the first fitness report form specifically written for the Marine Corps — "Report on Fitness of Officers of the Marine Corps — Form NMC 652." Like the then existing Navy form, of which it was an obvious offshoot, MajGen Elliott's form consisted primarily of a series of questions with fixed adjectival answers, or ratings in numerical form on a Navy scale of 4.0. It is a simple, practical document with obvious emphasis on attributes and skills demanded by the expeditionary era of its origin. One interesting refinement of the Elliott system was a separate form for commanding officers, thus highlighting the particular requirements for excellence in command.

With modifications, the foregoing form remained in use until the mid-1920s when the Marine Corps, no doubt under the influence of WWI, adopted, with only minor adaptations, the Army's efficiency report. This form, with Navy-Marine ground rules, continued virtually unchanged until 1950, and is in fact the basis of the fitness report now current. After WWII, however, there was dissatisfaction with the old, Army-type form, and a research

project was launched by the Personnel Department to discover a more discriminating kind of fitness report for the Marine Corps. After extensive experiment including submission of sample reports by selected reporting seniors on selected "guinea-pig" officers, using 7 different pilot-model forms, a completely new and different Marine Corps fitness report was adopted in 1950. This form, however, turned out to be so new and different that selection boards seemed unable to make head or tail of it, and, in 1952, we went back to a somewhat streamlined version of the old reliable of the 1920s, which is still with us.

Before we pass on, however, it would be well to note one feature of the pre-WWII system which is not here any longer. That is the determination of rating errors on the part of reporting seniors. As is well known, no two reporting seniors mark exactly alike. An "Excellent" from one may be worth "Outstanding-plus" from another, and so on. In the smaller Corps of the 1930s, the marking habits of each reporting senior were tabulated, and every selection board had before it the average deviation, plus or minus — the "index correction," as British Navy personnel people accurately term it — of all reporting seniors in the Marine Corps.

Where We Stand Today

Where we stand today is well known. Fitness reports are increasingly less useful as comparative devices. For example, a recent sampling indicated that 98 per cent of all colonels are rated "excellent" or above in "General Value to the Service," and that 85 per cent in turn were "Excellent to Outstanding" or higher. Ninety-two per cent of all second lieutenants are above

average or higher — a statistical nonesuch.

The higher the rank of the officer reported on, however, the more outstanding he becomes. The following table, which records a 1956 sampling of several thousand reports, shows the per cent of officers, by rank, who were rated as "Outstanding" in regular duties and general value to the service:

Rank	Per cent "Outstanding" (Regular Duties)	Per cent "Outstanding" (General Value to Service)
2dLt	4%	2%
1stLt	20%	7%
Capt	33%	15%
Maj	51%	32%
LtCol	60%	39%
Col	70%	55%

Correspondingly, like inflated currency, the really high ratings lose value because they go to almost anybody who manages to keep out of hack. The only things more inflated than today's fitness reports are citations, and awards in Korea were all too often given to do the job which a properly governed system of fitness reporting should have been able to handle. With intensely increasing competitive pressure for promotion within large "hump" groups on the Lineal List, selection boards shake their heads over files of meaninglessly similar reports, mostly "Excellent" or better, while the rarely candid reporting senior who describes a truly above-average officer as just that, merely engineers his being passed over in favor of some "Outstanding" fellow who got that way through inflation.

True, a new, or, more accurately, a considerably refined fitness report has been under study for some time. This, it has been claimed, would, simply by its form, help to damp down the over-marking and blunted discrimination between individuals which have grown up with the existing form and its predecessors.

Maybe.

But real change in the mind-set of the Marine Corps on fitness reports will require more than just a new form, because the conditions which have brought us where we are largely transcend the form of the report and extend deep into the surrounding rules and ground rules.

Problems of Fitness Reporting

Among the many problems which beset anyone trying to improve our system of fitness reporting, four should stand out immediately. Briefly noted, they are as follows:

- 1) Over-generosity vs. candor, on the part of reporting seniors.
- 2) Pro's and con's of seeing your own fitness reports.
- 3) How to describe ordinary weaknesses.
- 4) Keeping evaluations within a normal (Gaussian) distribution.

Problem 1 (Over-generosity vs. Candor): This problem can be demonstrated by an example in the first person. During a cruise at sea, early in my days as a Marine, my detachment commander sent to the captain recommended markings for my first fitness report. Taking the adjectives of the report at anything like face value, the markings were fair; some were even generous. But the Exec, a kindly and practical man, moved all recommended markings exactly one notch to the right, observing that the increasing pressures of selection made it best to be safe not sorry. Though I blessed him then, and still do, for his good heart and shrewd motives, that officer — like thousands of other reporting seniors before and since — was undermining realistic officer evaluation in the Marine Corps and Navy.

It is a great dilemma for the conscientious reporting senior to follow, on the one hand, the unmistakable language and meaning of the fitness report, while, on the other, he assesses what redemption-value his report will command before a selection board. If the reporting senior is a typically loyal CO who thinks well of his typically good juniors, he will always strain a point to put the best face on their performance. After all, he wants to see them promoted, and he knows they are at least as good as the next. The result? Creeping inflation of values, and steady debasement of the reporting system. And all from the very highest motives.

Problem 2 (Seeing your own reports): Human nature being what it is, only a man of granite fails to temper a fitness report which will

immediately be reviewed by the subject. That this is so doesn't always, or often, bespeak a craven, unsure reporting senior. Ordinary kindness, decent courtesy, and frequently a practical desire to maintain effective, encouraging relationships with subordinates, all conspire to blandish and mollify any fitness report which is seen by the officer concerned. You can bet your last dollar that Gen Cass's 1813 report, quoted earlier, wasn't initialled by the officers he wrote up. But it is a penetrating, trenchant document, and one which a selection board would have great difficulty in misunderstanding.

From the Marine Corps point of view, the problem is — how to elicit objective, unsparing appraisals in



reports which the subject sees, and still maintain unimpaired human relationships between reporting senior and the officer reported on?

Theoretically — as we are all men of granite (in theory) — this is no problem. In actuality, it is a big one.

Problem 3 (Dealing with Ordinary Weaknesses): Everyone has weak points as well as strong ones. This is a fact of life which our fitness reporting system completely evades. When fitness reports were first adopted, there were no selection boards, and the Naval Examining Board for promotion was the only means of weeding out the culls. Part of the old-time examining board ritual was that every adverse comment, however slight, had to be noted in the findings of the examining board, with an indication that the board had considered the point,

and was (or was not) prepared to waive it. Thus developed what has become, in the opinion of many, an almost fetishistic one-sided approach toward adverse entries, even the most trivial.

As matters stand today, despite common recognition in other matters that all of us are but mortal, the bugbear of an "Unsatisfactory Report" hovers about any fitness report which suggests even ordinary fallibility in the subject. Instead of reports being honest studies in light and shade, they become strained efforts in comparative degrees of light. All this mellow light which makes a Galahad out of every officer, however, causes severe eyestrain to selection boards.

Problem 4 (Maintaining Normal Distribution): In every human group, there are a few bad eggs, about an equal number of really good ones, and a preponderantly average collection of in-betweens. When you plot such a distribution on a graph, you get a symmetrical, bell-shaped curve. This is known as a "normal" or Gaussian distribution. The Gaussian distribution applies to any average group. It certainly applies, or should apply, in any method of personnel evaluation.

Considering Marine officers as a whole, you find a few eight-balls at one end of the curve, a few superior individuals at the other end, and, in the middle, all the rest of us. In theory, this indisputably real distribution of talent ought to reflect in the pattern of fitness report markings: a few outstanding ones, a few unsat's, and the rest about midway between. In sharp contrast to the theory (and to the facts of life, as well), however, today's pattern of fitness reporting, as we have seen, produces an expected few unsatisfactory reports, almost no average ones, and a huge blob of highly commendatory markings which not only drown out the really superior performers but elevate the great mass of officers to an impossible plateau of inflated "excellence" on which selection boards find it well-nigh impossible to move with certainty.

This, in fact, is the central problem which all others, however significant in themselves, contribute to bring about. Nobody yet has figured out a way to keep fitness report

markings in the Gaussian straight-and-narrow.

Various Approaches to the Problems

At this point, it might be well to repeat—the fitness reporting system has a mission and two tasks.

Mission: To characterize each individual officer, and to provide a basis of comparison among all officers, in order to . . .

Tasks: 1) Detail officers to best advantage, and,
2) Promote those who are best fitted.

To accomplish this mission and these tasks, several *procedural* problems immediately arise.

Foremost, or at least first, among the working problems of fitness reporting is, how best to characterize and compare? The most frequently employed methods of rating are: numerical grades (like a report card); selection of adjectival ratings on fixed scale (the Marine Corps

method); essay-type descriptions or comments (also used by the Marine Corps); and various kinds of fixed question-and-answer selections. At one time or another, the Marine Corps uses or has used all 4. Now and in the past, all have been fairly satisfactory in *characterizing*—that is, telling what kind of an individual the subject is. Where all fall down is in *comparison*.


Recognizing this problem some years ago, Gen Herron of the Army proposed in *The Infantry Journal* a method of comparison which, although not accepted at the time, still looks to many like the only hard-pan solution. On every fitness report, said Gen Herron, the reporting senior should be required to state, 1) how many officers of the individual's grade he reported on; and 2) where, numerically, among those officers, he ranked this one. In other words, for instance, a captain's fitness report would have some such entry as this: "There are 8 captains

whom I report on; among these, I rank Capt Doe No. 3."

This would be a dread device, for it would compel reporting seniors to fish or cut bait. But it would provide for every officer in the Marine Corps, over the length of his career, an absolutely determinable standing among his peers.

Choice of meaningful ratings and scales is also important. Right now, we seem to be unintentionally trapped by a scale which seems to encourage a normal distribution, but doesn't. By all common sense, our present "Below Average—Average—Above Average" scale is a good one, but somehow most fitness reports defy statistical law and end up with the average far above the average. One reason for this accentuation of the positive is the distribution of rating possibilities.

It is a simple mathematical fact that our present fitness report includes more favorable rating categories than it does relatively unfavorable ones. Starting with "aver-



age" as the median, there are 3 ratings to the right ("above average," "excellent" and "outstanding"), and only 2 ("below average" and "unsatisfactory") on the left. This automatically starts producing a lopsided, non-Gaussian distribution of ratings. It is, in all probability, one of the prime reasons why too many officers hit "excellent" on the present form. Thus, the first step in constructing a practical rating scale should be to make it even—a median center, however, entitled, and an equal spread of rating possibilities on each side. Until we do this, we will continue off balance.

However average he really is, nobody likes to be called average. This unquestionably gives the rating of "average" a kind of black eye. Similarly, "below average" and its one-time predecessor, "fair," have so ill a cast that they have come to be regarded as unsatisfactory in themselves. Here again we have intangible factors which press ratings up, meaninglessly up, toward the "excellent" level. Finally, we hear people excusing this inflation of values with the (statistically) stupid remark, "Everybody gets an 'excellent' because the average Marine officer is an excellent officer." On our present scale, what does that make the "above average" officer—below average?

Thus another beneficial change would be to select a series of adjectival ratings with a median which, however statistically average, avoids the imputation of mediocrity, which, unfortunately, "average" now does. I would suggest "well qualified," for that is what we hope the average Marine always is. In a balanced distribution about "well qualified," I would suggest the following standard adjectives:

UNSATISFACTORY
SATISFACTORY
WELL QUALIFIED
SUPERIOR
UNSURPASSED

Here we have a rating scale which would encourage normal distribution of markings. It defers to our hope that the typical Marine is a pretty good one, and, by choice of words, makes it hard for a reporting senior to tell the Commandant, with

a straight face, that all his officers are superior or unsurpassed. Some outfit.

So far, most of our concern has been with the average—which nobody now is. Isn't it time we considered the problems posed by the cases which are clearly outstanding or clearly unfavorable?

In today's bull market, the main problem connected with outstanding ratings is to limit them to officers who, honest and truly, are outstanding. One way to do this is to discontinue "outstanding" and select an even more super-duper adjective, such as "unsurpassed." This, in comparison to monetary reforms, is like cancelling one type of paper currency, and instituting a new one that looks different.

A second, much more definitive way to clamp down on shotgun use of outstanding ratings would be to define the term very sharply and then limit narrowly the authority to use it. In British Army fitness reports, for example, the rating of "outstanding" is defined as, "... reserved for those officers who are considered to have characteristics which should bring them to the highest positions in the Army."

Only a British general officer commanding-in-chief may give a rating of outstanding to a field or general officer. This is a lesson we could well learn.

The main lesson to be learned on the other side of the ledger is how to deal with ordinary weaknesses, that is, with the minor fallibilities which are part of every personality. This one we have never licked.

The first step seems to be radical revision of our concept of what really is an unfavorable report. Certainly, frank and honest appraisal of an average individual in the total spectrum of his character should be possible without making the report technically an "unfavorable" one. Today, however, a reporting senior has only 2 choices—either to stigmatize the individual, or to present him as a person without any known fault, however minor. In other words, either Peck's bad boy or little Lord Fauntleroy. How absurd.

Should we not therefore try to discover some means whereby reporting seniors may (and do) comment on the general run of ordinary deficiencies in the individual, such

observations expressly not to constitute an adverse report, unless, in the judgment of the reviewing officer, they are such as to warrant statement by the individual?

Here we encounter an intriguing distinction among character defects. Some, like idleness, are correctable; others, like stupidity, are not. In some services (the British Navy and Marines, for example) an individual is informed of correctable defects, but is rated without his knowledge on inherent defects. The theory is that there is nothing you can do about an inherent fault, so why should your boss wave it in your face?

This in turn brings us to the whole question of seeing one's own report, or seeing some part of it, and when?

As has been noted, there are strong reasons why a completely private system of officer evaluation would be considerably more useful, principally because it would generate wholly unvarnished appraisals. Aside from the fact that this would further extend the odious *dossier* method of personnel administration which has already infested too much of our Society, it is undeniable that it does an officer good—periodically—to see himself as others see him.

Perhaps it would be best to revert to the pre-WWII practice of not ordinarily showing immediately completed reports to the subject, but to make them available to him at Headquarters. Coupled with this might be a requirement that the reporting senior make known to the individual all exceptionally favorable aspects of his performance, together with all *correctable* deficiencies.

Another perennial problem which we seem to dodge—perhaps because it is too tough on reporting seniors—is fitness and readiness for promotion.

Evaluation of fitness and readiness for promotion is, or should be, one of the 2 main tasks of a fitness report. Because our fitness report does not take notice of this problem, isn't it only half effective, regardless of where else it shines? However it may hurt reporting seniors, this is one which must be faced. I therefore suggest that the Marine Corps adopt an entry like this:

Is this officer:

- ☐ Ready for promotion now?
- ☐ Soon?
- ☐ Probably, in due course?
- ☐ Possibly?
- ☐ Unlikely to become fitted for promotion?
- ☐ Too recently promoted for recommendation/Insufficiently observed?

Such an entry would earn the thanks of every selection board.

Reviewing Fitness Reports

The reviewing officer is one of the most under-employed individuals in the entire Marine Corps system of personnel evaluation. That this is so, probably stems from general disinclination to interfere with the judgments of commanding officers. But we shouldn't lean over backward: the reviewing officer can do 2 things, both necessary and important for fully effective fitness reporting. First, he should be able to redress the infrequent report which is unfair either to the individual or to the Marine Corps. Second, and as a matter of routine, the reviewing officer should indicate whether he considers a report is under-graded, over-graded, or about right. This would be one way to rebuild our pre-WW II set of index factors on reporting habits throughout the Corps. The British Navy (who use numerical grades, not adjectives) require the reviewing officer to give a numerical "index correction" — like a gunnery spot — which in his judgment is required to bring each report exactly into focus. At the Admiralty, these index corrections are tabulated for every reporting senior in the Royal Navy.

While our system does not lend itself exactly to such a procedure, it does seem that reviewing officers should be brought more into the picture. Accordingly, I suggest that the next Marine Corps fitness report to be adopted should conclude with a reporting senior's entry along these lines:

"This officer is (not) personally known to me.

- ☐ I have fully satisfied myself that the ratings and remarks on this report are accurate and fair.
- ☐ I concur with the tenor of this report, but consider it (over-graded) (under-graded).
- ☐ I disagree with this report for

the reasons and in the respects stated in my comments below."

Constructing an Ideal Report

Up to this point, we've talked about many aspects of both the fitness report itself and its surrounding system and ground rules. Now let's construct an ideal — well, perhaps not "ideal," but, at any rate, a fitness report which responds to the ideas expressed so far. . . .

What you will see is my idea of the main body of such a report, with — to save space — the administrative entries omitted. (See pages 27 & 28.)

As may be readily seen, this proposed form is a projection of the present fitness report. But look it over closely, and you'll realize that it includes several radical departures as well as quite a few lesser improvements.

Let's see . . .

Administrative entries: Although not shown, for space's sake, the administrative entries would definitely continue recommendations for assignment. Moreover, this section should be changed so as to elicit general comments on the duties for which the individual is best suited. For reserve officers, here would be a chance to give recommendations, if any, on special mobilization assignment.

Individual Attributes (how the man fits the mold): Many of these are familiar in themselves, but note some changes in clarifying wording: for example, "prolonged pressure" is added to fatigue and hardship under the item, "Endurance." Several new attributes have likewise been added. Today's report has 12; here we suggest 17. The new ones are:

Personal Appearance
Power of Spoken Expression
Power of Written Expression
Social Presence
Professional Knowledge and Background
Organizing Ability

"Economy in Management," often a somewhat mealy-mouthed attribute to define and rate, has been wholly reoriented toward a concept traditional to the good Marine: "Does the best he can with what he has." "Force" now appears in nobler garb as "Moral Force."

Numerical Ranking: Here is the

first major departure. Here we would require the senior to tell how many officers of this rank he marks, then, where among these officers, he ranks this one.

Overall Value to the Service: Note the tight definition of "Outstanding"; note also that this rating may not be given to anybody above captain, except by a general officer.

Qualification for Promotion: Here is another point at which this form squarely meets a requirement which we now go some lengths to avoid. Is our man ready now? Soon? Probably never?

Comments: Living up to the earlier discussion, we here enjoin the reporting senior to come clean on "any ordinary deficiencies, either correctable or inherent" which need mention to balance up the subject. Such a report would not be considered as unsatisfactory or referred to the subject officer, unless the reviewing officer so determined. This would bring about a revolution in present practice, a revolution of realism. Note further that the individual need only be informed of correctable aspects of his performance, not inherent faults (unless, as we see in the next entry, they amount to "serious deficiency or misconduct").

Reviewing Officer's Action: Here the reviewing officer must earn his pay. He has to say whether he agrees with the report completely, whether he believes it is in the right direction but out of focus, or whether he thinks it stinks. He, too, has a section for comments.

An Improved System

With a fitness report of this general character as its central feature, the Marine Corps could adopt several improving changes in today's system of fitness reporting. Some of these changes would logically derive from the report itself, whereas others stand on their own feet.

Change 1 — Greater Use of Letter Reports: We should recognize that the standard fitness report form is only applicable to the individual when the reporting senior himself is a US military officer, familiar with the traditional attitudes and practices which govern military fitness reporting. Further, we should also recognize that the usefulness of such a "canned" type of evaluation diminishes sharply in the cases of

OFFICER FITNESS REPORT—U. S. MARINE CORPS

How do you rate this officer in:

	NOT OBSERVED	UNSATISFACTORY	SATISFACTORY	WELL QUALIFIED	SUPERIOR	UNSURPASSED
1. ENDURANCE (<i>Performs effectively under physical hardship or prolonged pressure</i>)						
2. PERSONAL APPEARANCE (<i>Habitually appears neat, smart, well-groomed in uniform or civilian clothes</i>)						
3. ATTENTION TO DUTY (<i>Works diligently and conscientiously</i>)						
4. MILITARY PRESENCE (<i>Maintains appropriate dignity and soldierly bearing</i>)						
5. COOPERATION (<i>Works effectively and harmoniously with others</i>)						
6. INITIATIVE (<i>Acts with imagination, energy, and self-reliance; does not wait to be told</i>)						
7. JUDGMENT (<i>Grasps situations readily and reaches sound conclusions</i>)						
8. PRESENCE OF MIND (<i>Reacts promptly and sensibly in emergency or under great strain</i>)						
9. MORAL FORCE (<i>Pursues with energy, tenacity, and resolution what he believes to be his duty</i>)						
10. LEADERSHIP (<i>Inspires confidence and exerts strong influence on subordinates and coequals</i>)						
11. LOYALTY (<i>Renders unswerving allegiance to the Corps and to seniors and juniors alike</i>)						
12. POWER OF SPOKEN EXPRESSION (<i>Speaks or instructs effectively</i>)						
13. POWER OF WRITTEN EXPRESSION (<i>Writes clearly, concisely, and correctly</i>)						
14. SOCIAL PRESENCE (<i>Displays courtesy; knowledge of good manners, and decorum appropriate to the occasion</i>)						
15. PROFESSIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND BACKGROUND (<i>Keeps up to date in all professional matters, has extensive background knowledge</i>)						
16. ORGANIZING ABILITY (<i>Deals logically and effectively with organizational problems</i>)						
17. ECONOMY IN MANAGEMENT (<i>Does the best he can with what he has</i>)						

Performance of duty (<i>based on fact</i>):	REGULAR DUTY	ADDITIONAL DUTIES	COMMAND ABILITY	LEADING OFFICERS	LEADING ENLISTED	TRAINING
1. INSUFFICIENTLY OBSERVED						
2. INADEQUATE*						
3. ACCEPTABLE WITHIN INHERENT LIMITATIONS						
4. COMPETENT AND DEPENDABLE						
5. SUPERIOR IN MOST RESPECTS						
6. OUTSTANDING TO A DEGREE FOUND IN VERY FEW OFFICERS						

There are _____ officers of this grade upon whom I currently report. On the basis of this officer's personal and professional character, abilities, and performance of duty, I would place this officer numerically as _____
1st, 2d, etc.

Give your estimate of this officer's overall value to the service by marking one space below:

- 1. INSUFFICIENTLY OBSERVED ☐
- 2. NOT FUNDAMENTALLY OF OFFICER CALIBER* ☐
- 3. ACCEPTABLE BUT WITH SOME LIMITATIONS ☐
- 4. EXCELLENT ☐
- 5. SUPERIOR IN MOST RESPECTS ☐
- 6. OUTSTANDING TO A DEGREE WHICH SHOULD BRING HIM TO THE HIGHEST AND MOST RESPONSIBLE DUTIES IN THE MARINE CORPS** ☐

Considering the possible requirements of service in war, indicate your attitude toward having this officer under your command.

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> NO ONE I WOULD RATHER HAVE | <input type="checkbox"/> PREFER HIM TO MOST |
| <input type="checkbox"/> PLEASED TO HAVE | <input type="checkbox"/> WILLING TO HAVE |
| <input type="checkbox"/> PREFER NOT TO HAVE* | <input type="checkbox"/> INSUFFICIENTLY OBSERVED |

This officer is ready for promotion:

- | | |
|---|-----------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> NOW | <input type="checkbox"/> SOON |
| <input type="checkbox"/> PROBABLY, IN DUE COURSE | <input type="checkbox"/> POSSIBLY |
| <input type="checkbox"/> UNLIKELY TO BECOME FITTED FOR PROMOTION | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> INSUFFICIENTLY OBSERVED
(DELETE AS APPROPRIATE) | |

COMMENTS: To be completed by reporting senior in pen and ink. Record in this space a concise appraisal of the professional character of the officer reported on. If the period covered includes service in combat, make specific mention and evaluation of this officer's conduct and performance of duty therein. Mention any ordinary deficiencies, either correctable or inherent, which you feel should be noted to provide a balanced appraisal of this officer (such remarks will not render this an unsatisfactory report unless so determined by the reviewing officer):

- ☐ I have not shown this completed report to the officer reported on, but have made known to him the aspects of his performance, favorable or correctable, covered above, which I consider should be brought to his attention.

Signature

Date

* Constitutes an unsatisfactory marking.

** For officers of field grade, may only be given by a general officer.

(To be completed by the officer reported on when any single-starred item above is marked, or when any serious correctable deficiency, or misconduct, is referred to in "Comments"):

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> I HAVE SEEN THIS COMPLETED REPORT. | <input type="checkbox"/> I HAVE NO STATEMENT TO MAKE. |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> I HAVE ATTACHED A STATEMENT.
(check one) |

Signature of officer reported on

Date

Remarks by reviewing officer:

THIS OFFICER IS (NOT) PERSONALLY KNOWN TO ME.

- ☐ I have fully satisfied myself that the ratings and remarks on this report are accurate and fair.
- ☐ I concur with the tenor of this report, but consider it (under-graded) (over-graded) (delete one).
- ☐ I disagree with this report for the reasons and in the respects stated in my comments below.

COMMENTS: (must not be left blank in the case of a report requiring reference to the officer reported on, or of an outstanding report):

senior officers, general in particular.

Thus I propose that essay-type, letter reports be substituted for the form whenever, 1) the reporting senior is not a US military officer (e.g., for civilian or foreign reporting seniors), or 2) the subject is a general officer.

Change 2 — Justification for Exceptional Reports: One way to confine the preponderance of reports to the median area where the preponderance of people fall would be to require written comment by the reviewing officer on any report which contains either outstanding or unsatisfactory marks or remarks — in other words, justification or confirmation that the exceptional rating really can be supported. Our proposed sample form therefore contains instructions that reviewing officers must comment on any such exceptional reports.

Change 3 — Analysis of Individual Reporting Habits: Earlier we have spoken of the need to determine and tabulate the reporting habits of reporting seniors, as used to be done in years gone by. Today, with many thousand officers in the Corps, this becomes a much heavier task. But it also becomes an even greater necessity. Can we harness the IBM machine or some type of data processing system, to store up information as to whether a given officer tends to mark above, at, or below the norm? Perhaps, to lighten the load, this might be done only, say, after an officer has submitted more than 20 reports, thus getting data only on the reporting patterns of the heavy and increasingly senior contributors.

Change 4 — Unsatisfactory Reports: We must change our long-held ideas as to what constitutes an unsatisfactory report, and we must make it possible for ordinary weakness to be noted without blotting an officer's career. In general, this could be brought about in the manner shown in our sample form, that is, by employing the reviewing officer to determine when a report is in fact unsatisfactory in the formal sense. Only after such determination should we invoke the machinery of statement and the unsatisfactory label.

Change 5 — Access to Reports: After more than a decade's experi-

ence of cards-on-the-table rules whereby the rated individual immediately sees his completed report, it seems clear that this policy, however good in theory, has serious practical defects. Let us therefore walk back the cat, and return to the older procedure whereby completed reports other than those determined to be unsatisfactory — may only be seen by the individual after they have been received and filed at Marine Corps Headquarters.

To sum up, we now have a fitness report and a reporting system which are considerably short of what they might be. We are trapped in a one-

way street leading toward ever more inflated evaluation. Our report bypasses the primary function of indicating clearly the officers who are most fitted for promotion. In our no doubt unintended creation of a report which is moderately easy on the reporting senior, we have gotten one which fails to help the whole Marine Corps as much as it could.

To remedy these faults, we need to modify the form of Marine Corps fitness reports, and we should reconsider our ground rules. If we do so wisely and courageously, we shall render a rewarding service to the Corps.

US MC

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To make sure you serve *quality* coffee in your open mess or exchange restaurant. For when the coffee pot pulls as much active duty as it does in the Marine Corps, you can't risk the gripes that are sure to come if your brand isn't the best.

Let the Standard Brandsman help you select the Chase & Sanborn blend that will please any leatherneck and still let you turn a profit.

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
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THE ROASTERS OF FANCY MARK

the largest selling hotel and restaurant brand



Freedoms Foundation Winner LtCol Thomas N. Greene, right, receives an encased George Washington Honor Medal in recognition of his first place award-winning entry in the Freedoms Foundation letter-



writing contest. Making the presentation is Dr. Kenneth D. Wells, President of the Foundation, while Gen Randolph McC. Pate, Commandant of the Marine Corps, observes. Col Greene is a student at Senior School, MCS, Quantico.

Sextant navigation through fair weather and foul has been made possible with a precision radio sextant designed and built by Collins Radio Company.

Developed for the Navy's Bureau of Ships, the device has been used to make the first continuous tracking of the moon by radio.

The sea service soon may be casting off its traditional manila hemp mooring lines for ones made of nylon.

On 2 Military Sea Transport Service vessels nylon lines have been in use for 2 years. Smaller than manila lines, they have proved to wear longer, be easier to handle and stronger.

An air-droppable beacon light with a visible light range of 5 miles when viewed from 1,000 feet altitude and an infrared range when viewed from the ground has been developed by the Army. The pathfinder is used to mark assembly points for airborne troops and can be erected and operated by one man.

A high-speed personnel parachute with low opening shock loads has been delivered to the Navy for final qualification tests.

Named the Skysail, the chute was designed and developed by Radioplane, a division of Northrop Aviation, Inc.

A series of rings with crescent-shaped slots slow the opening and reduce shock in high-speed emergency bail outs. The new chute has exceeded requirements that call for a 400 knot opening at 15,000 feet.

LtCol Margaret M. Henderson, (since promoted to colonel) is congratulated by Gen Randolph McC. Pate, Commandant of the Marine Corps, upon her appointment as Director of Women Marines. The ap-



pointment was announced 13 February 1959, the Women Marines' 16th Anniversary.


She succeeds Col Julia E. Hamblet who reverts to the rank of lieutenant colonel in her new assignment to the staff of CIC, Allied Forces Southern Europe, in Naples.

An aluminum submarine, which will plumb ocean depths 3 miles below the surface and make possible deep-sea explorations by oceanographers, is being designed by Reynolds Metal Company.



A company spokesman said the first phase in the 5-stage project has been completed. Feasibility studies indicate that the sub would be capable of exploring at 15,000 feet for 36 hours and have a range of 100 miles.

Jupiter, an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile designed for use against ground targets at ranges up to 1,500 miles, is "flight tested" in this 60-foot tower at the Army's Chrysler-operated Michigan Ordnance Missile Plant in Detroit.



For qualification tests the Jupiter is subjected to pressure and aerodynamic loads to duplicate the effect of actual firing thrust.



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TEAMED FOR DEFENSE

ANIP... the Army-Navy Instrument Program... is a prime example of Service teamwork. The goal is to provide ideal all-weather cockpit instrumentation for both fixed wing and rotary aircraft. The approach to the problem is new... that of fitting the *machine* to the *man*. The result will be to create a synthetic picture of the outside world right in the cabin, relieving the pilot of the complexities of instrumentation.

This working unity among the Services pools talents and abilities to reach the goal... with savings in time, money and manpower. The benefits will be far-reaching... for aircraft, for helicopters, for every branch of military service. Bell Helicopter Corporation, as rotary-wing industry coordinator, is privileged to be a working member of the Service team.



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Here's how

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Instrument

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
ANIP

This is one of a series of ads currently appearing in such opinion-making publications as Fortune, Business Week and U.S. News & World Report... informing the public of special projects and significant advances in technology being made by various branches of our military services.

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MARINE CORPS SUPPLY SYSTEM



High speed printer and tape reader unit—part of the new Univac computer system.



Univac equipment is operated by Marine Corps personnel.

ALL THE QUARTER OF A MILLION ITEMS IN THE MARINE CORPS' GIGANTIC supply bin—everything from shoelaces to 60-ton tanks—will soon be controlled by Univac, Sperry Rand Corporation's electronic brain. A network by which computers in widely separated sections of the country will soon be "talking" with each other has already been put in operation at MCSC, Albany, Ga. Subject of the conversations will relate to keeping track, with unparalleled accuracy, of the Corps' nearly 2 billion dollars worth of materiel.

In full scope, the new system will tie major East and West Coast installations into networks which, in turn, will interlock with a master control point in Philadelphia. Within the network, the withdrawal of each inventory item at any Marine Corps stock point will be recorded on punched cards. This information will then be transmitted automatically to machines at the Albany or Barstow Supply Centers, where it will be processed through Univac and stored on magnetic tape. At required intervals the information on tapes will be transferred to the Inventory Control Point, Philadelphia. In this way the exact stock level of any given item can be determined. In addition, Univac will tell stock managers which items are in short supply.

Replenishment of stock levels at outlying bases will be automatic. When Univac "decides" that an item should be replenished at a stocking point, the necessary documents will be automatically produced, directing shipment to the point where it is needed. This means, in effect, Univac will be sending out supplies almost before any human brain becomes aware such items are needed.

Besides Barstow and Philadelphia, other Marine Corps installations to be linked in the computer network are: MCB, Camp Lejeune; MCB, Camp Pendleton; Recruit Depots at Parris Island and San Diego; MCS, Quantico; MCTC, 29 Palms; and Marine Corps Supply Forwarding Annex, San Francisco.

US & MC



Maze of wires necessary for Univac remote control.

equipment is entirely rated Marines.



nic remember and compute.

ps G • April 1959

AUTOMATION IN SUPPLY

by Maj O. R. Lodge



FROM THE FIRST DAY THAT A MARINE COMES ON ACTIVE DUTY, he is impressed with the large volume of paperwork that is required in the proper functioning of the Marine Corps. Many directives have been written and numerous studies conducted on how to reduce this administrative burden, and constant search continues to find better and more efficient ways to simplify complex and repetitive paperwork.

The development and perfection of the punched card system which is the basis for the work done by the former Machine Records Installations (now designated Data Processing Installations) relieved commanders of many tasks formerly accomplished manually. Since a large amount of paperwork is generated in those functions dealing with supply, it was in this area that mechanical methods of processing paid great dividends. With the exploration of added capabilities of the various mechanical devices, more and better information became available to management. As facts were

analyzed, management became aware of certain inadequacies of present procedures. Further demands were heaped on the already burdened machines. It soon became apparent that faster methods of processing the tons of paperwork were required. The additional requirement for more accurate information to support the Marine Corps budget, the expanding stores accounting system, tighter inventory control, and added reports required by Department of Defense emphasized the need.

The search was on again, and the formal board, established to study the problem, soon was convinced that the new "electronic brains" being manufactured by the various business machine companies could perform the monumental task which would be asked of them by the Marine Corps. The board examined the various electronic data processing equipment available to determine which would be the best for the anticipated needs of the Marine Corps. After many months of analyzing existing operations, determining the

benefits in terms of better management data being available, and finding the benefits of more rapid automation in terms of cost savings, the board made its recommendations to the Commandant.

One of the recommendations approved was a program for the adaptation of Marine Corps Supply procedures (in the areas of inventory control and stores reporting) to Electronic Data Processing and Transmission. Today the program is no longer a study; it is a reality. We are in the Electronic Data Processing era in the Marine Corps.

Some of you are no doubt saying to yourselves, "Fine, but these electronic geniuses are not going to affect me. I have nothing to do with supply work." But nothing is farther from the truth. If you are in the Marine Corps YOU are going to be the one who makes this system work. You are the most important individual in the operation. Let us take a little closer look at this system, find out a few things about it, and see when it will be in operation.

Maj Lodge was commissioned in March 1943, after graduating from Ohio State University. He served as an artillery officer with the 3d Mar Div in 1944, and '45, and in Korea with the 1st MarDiv from Inchon to Chosin. His decorations include the Silver Star and Purple Heart. While assigned to Historical Branch, HQMC, he wrote the monograph *Recapture of Guam*. Maj Lodge is currently assigned to the Supply Department, HQMC.

The basic objectives of this program are to achieve a more effective, and at the same time, a better managed supply system, and to reduce the administrative burden of the lower echelons of the Marine Corps Stores System. This is just the official way of saying we want to provide better supply support and reduce the workload of the field commander. When this system is in full operation, the paperwork concerned with a requisition should be completed or passed to the next higher echelon of supply for action within 24 hours of receipt into the Stores System. A little hard to believe? It is true, nevertheless, if YOU get the requisition into the Stores System.

This rapid processing can only be accomplished by modern data processing and transmission equipment. Electronic Data Processing Machines (EDPM) are capable of performing complex clerical functions, automatically performing a sequence of logical operations, detecting errors which might occur in the process, and choosing one of several predetermined plans of action. The tremendous speed of the machines, coupled with their logical decision-making ability can do a tremendous job for us.

The "heart" of any data processing system is its storage or memory unit. This is where the designed set of instructions is stored along with other required bits of information. To solve a problem, the instructions are "read"; the machine then searches out the information required, stores it, processes it factor by factor (adding, subtracting, multiplying, or dividing as directed), and then prints the results in a readable form.

The following capabilities of electronic data processing equipment give some idea of the speed which can be obtained when proper programming is done. Magnetic tapes which are used as the memory units

are "read" at the rate of 75 inches per second; 300 punch cards can be "read" and directed to proper storage in one minute; 78,000 additions or subtractions can be calculated in one minute; 5,000 multiplications can be performed in one minute; 3,700 divisions can be computed in one minute; 138,000 logical decisions can be performed in one minute; and reports can be prepared at the rate of 600 lines per minute.

Electronic equipment has been perfected to such a high degree that it accomplishes the almost impossible. But, no one has made a machine with the ability to think. This means that the machine can process incorrect data just as fast as it can correct information. The Marine Corps cannot afford the luxury of the machines making incorrect calculations, searching for information that has not been put into the tapes, and developing reports that are not actually required and not properly utilized. The cold fact of \$300 per hour rental dictates that every Marine must do his or her part to ensure the development of logical concepts and the introduction of correct input data.

The Marine Corps supply procedures program requires the installation of electronic data processing equipment at Marine Corps Supply Centers in Albany, Georgia, and Barstow, California. Marine Corps Supply Activity, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, received the third installation. On 15 July the Albany computer arrived. Two months later Barstow received its equipment, and the Philadelphia installation went in 15 October. The necessary communications equipment, transceivers, and necessary land lines to tie in the supply activities on the east and west coast with the respective supply centers are also available. It is anticipated that a complete system will be in operation by 1 May 1959.

Rapid communication facilities between each supply center installation and the supply activities on its respective coast will permit daily transmission of transactions and daily updating of inventory status records at supply centers. Complete Marine Corps inventory status will be kept current through reports of active items to the Supply Inventory Control Point semi-monthly. Up-to-date reports will be developed which will permit management to initiate appropriate action. Each coast will have, in effect, a central supply point with warehouses, full of material, located at various Marine Corps installations.

In establishing procedures compatible with data processing equipment, every effort is being made to keep them as simple as possible for the user in the field. The cornerstone of the Supply Data Processing System is the Single Line Item Transaction Card. It fulfills the requirement for inventory control, requisitioning, receiving, adjusting, and reporting for the Stores System, and serves as the obligating document for fiscal control. This is the card you will prepare when you want supplies. This is also the card that creates the basic information which goes into the various tapes that will provide all subsequent data for reports. You, as the originator of this card, are creating the information on which the entire system is based . . . you are the most important person in the electronic data processing system. Once this card is prepared it is no longer necessary to reduce data to manual form for processing or for the development of management reports.

The program that the Marine Corps is undertaking is exceedingly ambitious. Other services have installed electronic computers to assist supply management but these installations were concerned with only a portion of the supply problem. The Marine Corps' will be the first integrated electronic computer program which ties in all components of a complete supply system. The progress we make and the results we obtain will be of great interest to the Departments of Navy and Defense. As with all other Marine Corps operations this one must also be a team effort for it to be a success.

USMC



SOVIET AIR TRANSPORT DEVELOPMENT

By Cdr Edward L. Barker, USNR

Photos supplied by author

✿ SINCE WWII, RUSSIA HAS MADE tremendous strides in scientific and technological development. Aside from amazing industrial and economic growth, the Soviets have made remarkable advances in the development of jet bombers, nuclear weapons, missiles, large earth satellites and most recently a trail-blazing cosmic rocket, Lunik, that now orbits the sun. Moreover, they are not resting on these achievements, for it is apparent from Soviet periodicals that plans have been formulated concerning the development of a nuclear-powered aircraft and space flight. These spectacular triumphs have overshadowed other areas of interest, including their recent splurge in transport aircraft development. As a matter of fact, the Soviets are devoting a sizable effort to gain prominence in this field. With the unveiling of a number of new transport aircraft during the past 2 years, the Soviets have very definitely served notice to the Free World that henceforth their air transports will be second to none. This "new look" in Soviet aviation has been received in the West with a mixture of fascination and concern.

Today, the expanding Communist empire controls more than 27 per cent of the world's land area and nearly a third of its population. The addition of a large fleet of fast new transport aircraft will serve to shrink the vast area of the USSR and to bring the non-communist world closer to the borders of Russia. This potential is highlighted by the fact that ground, surface and air transportation in the USSR have been notoriously poor by European and US standards.

From a military point of view,

Marine Corps Gazette • April 1959

however, the development of large, speedy transports is essential for the rapid airlifting of equipment and personnel to Russia's widely separated weapons systems, air facilities, land forces, naval bases and fleets. WWII proved to the Soviets the value of air transportation to move key personnel, speed essential freight and improve communications. During the war and until a few years ago, obsolete pre-war twin-engined American designed DC-3s continued to provide the backbone of their air-lift capability. This was a rather paradoxical situation in view of the emphasis that was being placed on the production of modern jet fighters and bombers at that time.

Recent changes in weapon technology have created new concepts and methods of warfare. Mobility is now of utmost importance in modern warfare, signifying the ability to shift material and personnel rapidly as a changing situation requires. This requirement is not being overlooked, since the Soviets realize that a strong air transport system will provide essential military strength and stimulate internal economic development as well. In addition, an important facet of Soviet policy is to use air transportation to spread communist ideals and Soviet economic and political influence throughout the non-communist world.

In the USSR of today, it is essential that supplies be hauled from factories to important air and naval bases by the fastest means available. Often these bases are located hundreds of miles from the nearest railroad and those in the far north are accessible to sea transportation for only a few months out of the year. In addition, skilled personnel must be moved speedily over the great expanse of the USSR to satisfy the communist government's insatiable demand for their technical services. Political and propaganda experts also must be transported rapidly, and in equipment second to none, within and beyond the domains of the USSR.

The bulk of the Soviets' military and civil airlift is performed by a single force called Aeroflot, an abbreviation of a title which could be translated as General Department of Civil Air Fleet of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. This or-

ganization controls the whole civil air fleet of the USSR and is responsible for a wide variety of duties, including crop spraying, ambulance services and special charters. Aeroflot, therefore, is much more than simply the Soviet national airline. It also has the announced responsibility for the construction and maintenance of civil airfields, airport hotels, crew rest centers, crew training facilities, aircraft and equipment overhaul centers, and communications and naval facilities.

Marshal Zhigarev, former commander of the Air Force of the Soviet Army, heads Aeroflot. In 1957 he replaced Air Marshal Zhavoronkov, who had held the job for 8 years and reportedly was in failing health. Zhavoronkov, a former naval pilot, is now First Deputy of Aeroflot.

It is quite evident that the movement of a top air force officer into a key Aeroflot position is indicative of the emphasis being placed on the

build-up of Soviet air transportation. The Soviets' rationalization of the apparent military flavor of their so-called civil air fleet is best stated in the words of an official of Aeroflot: "Don't you have air marshals in your corporations and civil airlines, too?" In terms designed for loyal communist readers, the Soviet publication *Herald of the Air Fleet* has expressed it this way: "For services rendered the aircraft monopolies in awarding military contracts, many generals and officers of the US military forces, upon leaving the services, occupy high positions in the administration of aeronautical firms, with huge salaries, bonuses, and pensions."

The addition of another military man in the top echelon of Aeroflot obviously indicates the importance of this organization and its definite military potential to the naval and military forces. Through their knowledge of Army, Navy and Air



Aeroflot pilots leave Soviet Li-2

Force requirements, Aeroflot can be subordinated to the military as world conditions dictate. In this connection, air transports have been used for many years to haul men and supplies to important air and naval bases above the Arctic Circle along the northern sea route.

Although the Soviets have pioneered in the hauling of air freight, they have never been as much concerned with air lifting passengers as they are about carrying things. Partly because of the poor conditions of their roads and railroads, the Soviets have consistently airlifted a greater percentage of freight than passengers. In 1950, Aeroflot's deputy chief of administration, General Vladimir Zahkarov, stated that "aircraft of our civil aviation carry more freight than in any capitalist country," and he undoubtedly was correct, for later Soviet releases placed their freight tonnage figures for the year 1953 at almost twice that of the US for the same year.

In addition to naval and military freight, Soviet air transports carry such things as mechanical and electrical equipment between industrial centers; high priority freight to remote areas undergoing expansion and industrialization; and live freight including animals, fish and insects. A load of monkeys was transported by jet transport from India in 1957 to be used in medical research. Mail, of course, is sped to all sections of the USSR by air. Prior to the introduction of jet



Soviet IL-14 piston engine transport

transports, the Soviets converted IL-28 BEAGLE light jet bombers for this purpose and for air transporting high priority freight.

Among the transport aircraft used in Russia today, the IL-12 and IL-14 still rate as the work horses of the airways. More of these aircraft have been built in the world than any other transport type except the DC-3 and its equivalents manufactured overseas under license. The IL-12 and IL-14 are twin-engined transports seating an average of 24 passengers. In appearance, these aircraft resemble the US Convair-Liner, though they are not as fast nor quite as large. The IL-14 was offered to India in 1956; however, after a careful examination of the aircraft's operating costs, the Indian

government declined the offer, in spite of the give-away prices quoted by the Russians.

Soviet transport aircraft in the early 1950's were scarcely comparable with contemporary Western types. Nevertheless, they were used for the long trunk routes in the USSR, on which frequent stops and changes of aircraft were necessary. The situation was tolerated because military aircraft development had priority, and it was not until Soviet military needs had been satisfied that attention was turned to the modernization and re-equipment of the Soviet air transport fleet.

The desire to gain prestige was undoubtedly an important factor when the decision was reached. As the USSR extended her influence internationally and invited more and more delegations from east and west to tour within the Soviet Union, the absence of modern airline equipment became an increasing embarrassment. This was reflected in the fact that foreign airlines flying services into Moscow were, for a time, not allowed to use their latest aircraft. For this reason alone, the Soviets' new equipment had to be in the same class as the best the West could offer.

Once the modernization of military aviation had been accomplished, Soviet designers were free to devote full attention to the development of a variety of modern jet transports to satisfy the aspirations of the expanding Russian octopus. The Soviets' concept was a bold one; they would skip long-



IL-28, Beagle, converted for carrying mail


range piston-engined transports and proceed with turbojet and turboprop development. Just after the war a few reciprocating four-engined IL-18 and TU-70 prototype transports were produced, but the demand for jet interceptors and TU-4s (B-29s) was over-riding.

In line with the Soviets' design philosophy, which emphasizes simplicity and utilizes proven designs and components interchangeably, existing military aircraft were studied for possible commercial adaptation. The results have been interesting, and several of the new transports show a striking resemblance to their military aircraft.


Currently, the Soviets have under study 5 distinct types of jet turbine-engine transports and one large twin-jet transport helicopter, MI-6. With 2 turbojet types, and 3 turboprop types, the USSR has, temporarily at least, a greater variety of turbine transports in the flight test stage than any other nation.

The complete galaxy of aircraft was shown in 1957 at Vnukovo Moscow airport and again in July 1958 at the Soviet Air Day Show over Tushino. A line-up of these new transports includes the twin-turbojet TU-104, the 4-turbojet TU-110, the 4-turboprop AN-10 UKRAINE, the 4-turboprop IL-18 MOSCOW, and the giant 4-turboprop TU-114 RUSSIA.


The best known of these aircraft is the TU-104 which became quite familiar the world over when, in



IL-18, Coot, 100-passenger turboprop



MI-6 helicopter



TU-110 cruises at 430 knots with 100 passengers

March 1956, it was flown to London with Malenkov aboard amid much fanfare and publicity. Needless to relate, the element of surprise was electrifying and, considering the paucity of information, the TU-104 took on an exaggerated importance. The TU-16 twin-jet bomber, a Tupolev design also known as the **BADGER**, provided the basis for the TU-104 transport.

A careful analysis of the TU-104 reveals that it represents a hasty transition into the jet transport age. In terms of sensible standards of air-transport economics, the aircraft does not qualify as a commercial transport. The TU-104 can be classed as an improvisation or a clever adaptation of a medium bomber to civil requirements. Precisely the same thing could have been done with the USAF B-47 several years earlier, but it would not have satisfied our economy-minded airlines.

In comparing the TU-104 with that of its closest Western counterpart, the French CARAVELLE, we find that the TU-104 is 50 per cent heavier and carries a smaller payload over roughly the same distance. Its sole advantage is speed, and although this is worth something, it is achieved through the use of large fuel-hungry engines.

Although the introduction of the TU-104 into operational service in 1956 marked a turning point in Soviet as well as world air transportation, it can be seen that the event was designed to provide Khrushchev



Cdr Barker was commissioned in the Naval Reserve in 1942. During WWII he served with the Eastern Sea Frontier as an Air Controller; with the British Fleet Air Arm as an Asst Operations and Liaison Officer; and aboard the USS Midway as an Air Intelligence Officer. At the present time he is an Aviation Analyst for the Navy Dept, and in addition is CO, Air Intelligence Reserve Training Unit 931, Willow Grove, Penna.

with propaganda victories. The TU-104 enjoyed the spot light as the only turbojet transport in regular international commercial service in the world, until just recently when Boeing 707s were delivered to US airlines.

Since the TU-104's first appearance in 1955 at least 50 have been built. In June 1956 one of these transports was displayed at the Zurich air show and reportedly offered for sale at \$1,190,000 as compared with more than \$2,800,000 for the British COMET 4A. Nevertheless there were no Free World takers at this bargain price, and the consensus of opinion seemed to be that the aircraft could not be operated competitively. Apparently Czechoslovakia, which has since become the first communist satellite to acquire TU-104s, had no choice in the matter.


Notwithstanding the negative aspects of the aircraft, it is apparent that the lack of operating economy is not of transcendent importance to

a totalitarian regime bent on a campaign for prestige. Costs are vital to the Free World's private, profit-seeking airlines, but of no importance to the communists. Of what concern was it to the Soviets that TU-104 aircraft used on 2 flights from Moscow to New York and back carrying Russian delegates to the UN General Assembly burned an excessive amount of fuel? After all, the flights were made in record time and the world's only passenger carrying jet transports made good propaganda when displayed to the American public.

The TU-110 is a good example of the Soviets' philosophy to use and reuse a proven design, thereby taking advantage of the interchangeability of components. This aircraft is nothing more than a 4-engined conversion of the TU-104 with an extra 4-foot fuselage section spliced in ahead of the wing. The TU-110 with its smaller engines, which are said to be extremely economical on fuel, appears to represent a short cut



TU-104 can cover 1900 nautical miles, nonstop



AN-10, *Ukrania*, carries 10 tons over 1600 nautical miles

to a reduction in operating costs. Its closest Western counterpart is the British COMET 4A which went into transatlantic service late last year. The TU-110 was designed by A. Luko of the Tupolev design team and developed under the guidance of Tupolev.

The most promising of the Soviets' new transport developments is the group of turboprop aircraft comprising the AN-10, IL-18, and TU-114. In developing turboprop engines the Soviets have worked very hard while the US has lagged. From every indication Soviet turboprops are the best and most powerful power plants produced, including the fine engines turned out by the British.

Significantly, the new turboprop transport aircraft cannot be classed as hasty adaptations of military models to civil use. Furthermore, they represent a subtle awareness by the Soviets of the importance of operating costs. A surprising amount of attention has been devoted to improving the commercial attractiveness of the new models.

The AN-10 *UKRANIA*, for example, is an intelligent compromise between a military transport and a passenger aircraft. This model differs from the rest of the Soviets' new transports in that it is a high-wing monoplane. From a recognition point of view it is configured like the USAF turboprop C-130. Operationally the AN-10 parallels the British VISCOUNT in that they fall in the medium-short-range class. An important feature to the Russians, who require operations out of the way areas, is the AN-10's ability to

operate from small sod fields. Because of its bulky configuration and sturdy operating features, this aircraft should prove readily adaptable to military requirements.


The AN-10 has a Soviet competitor in the form of the IL-18 Moscow. Designed by Ilyushin, the IL-18 has distinct Western lines and is not unlike its piston engined predecessor also designated IL-18. This sleek aircraft has one marked feature that places it apart from other Soviet transports—a solid nose section instead of the usual plexi-glass navigational nose. Like *UKRANIA*, the Moscow has 4 turboprop engines; however, it has a low straight-wing instead of a high-wing. The Moscow is also reputed to possess good short-field characteristics. The aircraft is quite similar in appearance to the US DC-6/DC-7 series and compares closely with the new Lockheed ELECTRA.

When it was first shown at Vnukovo, Ilyushin stated that "the Moscow flies better than the Lockheed ELECTRA," a claim that was impossible to disprove in view of the fact that the ELECTRA had not made its first flight at that time.

The IL-18 will probably replace IL-14s on the Moscow, Finland, Stockholm and Copenhagen runs. Also it is possible it will be used on the new Moscow to London air route. In the meanwhile the IL-18 has been put into operational use in the USSR and it currently in service on the Moscow-Kiev run.

The TU-114 *RUSSIA*, the newest and largest of the Soviets' new transports, enjoys the same affinity with the TU-95 BEAR heavy bomber as does the TU-104 with the TU-16 BADGER medium bomber. A tremendous amount of publicity has been provided the *RUSSIA*, and it is a fine example of the sputnik approach to aviation. The TU-114 was first shown in Moscow in early November 1957 and is claimed as the world's largest passenger carrying transport. In addition, it has 4 of the largest turboprop engines in the world mounted on swept-wings.

This large transport reportedly has a restaurant for 48 people and 2 elevators. According to the Soviets, the TU-114 can transport 120 passengers from Moscow to New York in from 10 to 12 hours. On shorter flight as many as 220 passengers can be accommodated. On routes where passenger traffic is light, its double-deck can be used to handle large quantities of cargo and mail.



TU-114, turboprop designed by Tupolev

The TU-114 is in the same size range as our turbojet Boeing 707 and DC-8. Of significance are the 2 big advantages enjoyed by the TU-114 over turbojet transports:

A turboprop operates more efficiently, using much less fuel for the same distance.

Propeller turbojet engines allow quicker take offs and landings from airfields with much shorter runways. The big TU-114 transport can use 6,000 to 7,000-foot strips; our big jets need 8,000 to 10,000-foot strips.

The ability to set wheels down on airfields already in existence in Europe, Africa and Asia could provide the Soviets an edge on the prestige and propaganda front. They can get their new transports in for the natives to see, thereby aiding their economic infiltration plans in the neutral and uncommitted countries.

In many foreign cities, new airfields will have to be built to receive our new jets. Indeed, many new airfields will have to be built, or existing ones enlarged, in the US in the next few years for the same reason.

With respect to airfields within the USSR, foreign travelers invariably comment on their inferior condition. They are rough and only a small proportion are considered first class airports by Western standards. This applies to their physical condition as well as to the equipment. Many airports used by transport aircraft lack concrete runways, thus explaining the built-in capability of the new Soviet aircraft to operate from sod runways. New terminal buildings and maintenance facilities have been erected at a number of first class airports during the post war years, but at most small city airports buildings are very primitive.

Civil airports simply have not shared the expansion and improvement experienced by military airfields. If a military airfield happens to be near an industrial center or at a well-traveled cross road stopover, the Soviet transport will use it, otherwise a landing on steel mats or sod is not uncommon.

Moscow of course is an exception. Vnukovo with its large transit hotel and fine airfield facilities serves as a showplace.

The MI-6, acclaimed as the world's most powerful helicopter, will not need expensively prepared air facilities. It is quite probable that this



Map of the flight of the TU-114

feature has a strong appeal to practical minded Russian planners.

According to the Soviets, Mil's new twin-turboprop helicopter will be used to deliver freight and supplies of all sorts to remote villages; to prospectors in the tundra and distant steppe areas; to explorers and scientists in the frozen arctic; and to construction sites far beyond established highways.

Turboprop transports in commercial use in the West are the Vickers VISCOUNT and the Bristol BRITANNIA. The Lockheed ELECTRA and the F-27 FRIENDSHIP are due to go into service this year. These aircraft span in size the Soviet turboprops with the exception of the TU-114 Moscow.

While the Soviets have made much propaganda over the fact that they are the only country with a turbojet transport in operational use, it remains that they have no large turbojet transport in the Boeing 707 (C-135) or the Douglas DC-8 category. The turboprop RUSSIA is comparable in size but has neither the speed nor range of the US turbojets.

Although to date the backbone of Aeroflot is still piston-engined transports, Soviet officials have stated that over a relatively short period Aeroflot plans to replace this obsolete equipment for almost all except agricultural work. A tremendous task, but one that has the Soviet Air Forces as a precedent!

The USSR has long regarded civil aviation as an essential element of national policy, and only incidentally as a means of accommodating civilians. Civilian transportation is merely a sideline, since the USSR's

immediate aim is to spread communist ideologies and Soviet economic and political influence throughout the non-communist world, by means of expansion of international air routes.

The Soviets are justifiably proud of their new family of jet transports. Repeatedly in their official organs such as *Soviet Aviation*, *Pravda*, *Wings of the Motherland* and *Civil Aviation*, the Soviets have stated that the air transport program is to be greatly expanded over the next 5 years. Nikita Khrushchev has time and again emphasized the importance of these new transports to the future of the USSR and its determination to compete with the Western nations.

It is significant that the Soviets have the capability to develop and produce new transport aircraft simultaneously with their military aircraft and missile programs. And although these transports are outwardly ear-marked for so-called civil use, it is well to recognize that they will always be available to service the Soviet industrial war machine.

With the build-up of the Soviets' air transport fleet comprising these new aircraft, a significant military potential will come into being, equaled only by the US's airlift capability. This force will have the capability of readily augmenting Soviet military aviation. Moreover, Russian personnel will have been excellently trained in all areas of operations including polar flights as well as flights to densely populated cities and industrial centers of the Free World.

US & MC

The man:



Pilot of a carrier-based Douglas A4D Skyhawk, this highly trained flier is on the alert for action at a moment's notice. Today, the Navy's water-borne "airfields" are an effective deterrent to the spread of brushfire wars.

The mission:


Providing support for our fast-moving military groups assigned to containment of Red threats. Here we see a phase of the brushfire operations at Quemoy.



The means:

The Douglas A4D Skyhawk, pocket-sized record-holding support aircraft:

Status In volume production
Speed Classified
Range Classified
Armament Conventional or nuclear
Service U. S. Navy



Depend on

DOUGLAS



The Nation's Partner in Defense

WE CAN DOUBLE T



Group I Honorable Mention

PRIZE ESSAY CONTEST
MARINE CORPS
ASSOCIATION



THE TRAINING WEEK



by LtCol T. N. Greene


My Lord,

If I attempt to answer the mass of futile correspondence that surrounds me, I should be debarred from all serious business of campaigning.

I must remind your Lordship—for the last time—that so long as I retain an independent position, I shall see that no officer under my command is debarred—by attending to the futile drivelling of mere quill-driving in your Lordship's Office—from attending to his first duty—which is, and always has been so to train the private men under his command that they may, without question, beat any force opposed to them in the field.

*I am, My Lord,
Your Obedient Servant,
Wellington.*

THE MUSKET GIVES WAY TO THE M-1; the cavalry charge is replaced by the vertical envelopment, but the first duty of an officer does not change. More than ever the complexities of the modern concept bring home the need for training. New T/O's, stripped of fat to save the muscle, require clerks to drive jeeps; clerks and jeep drivers to man local security weapons; and clerks, jeep drivers and local security men, all to know more than ever before about combat intelligence, practical communications, ABC defense, mine warfare, first aid and squad tactics. Each private in the new T/Os must know at least 2 jobs—usually more. The burden falls equally on officers and non-commissioned officers. As an example, a new lieutenant of field



LtCol Greene was commissioned in the Marine Corps in 1942. He served with the 2d MarDiv during WWII. In 1946 he completed the Advanced Artillery Course, MCS, Quantico, and since then has served with: HQMC, Div of Public Information; NROTC, Iowa State College; Staff, ComPhibPac; 11th Marines; 12th Marines. At the present time he is a student at Senior School, Quantico.

artillery, reporting to his first FMF duty, frequently becomes a platoon leader. This job—command of 4 guns, with technical problems of communications, survey, fire direction and fire support coordination—equals that of a captain battery commander in WWII, except that the guns are bigger; help from battalion is farther away and things move faster. Yes, there is more to the military art than in the quiet days of Wellington, but the first duty of an officer—commissioned, warrant or non-commissioned—is still to train his men.

It could be argued with some force that the battle of which Wellington wrote, was irrevocably lost the day the quill-driving clerk was replaced by the typist and the mimeograph machine. It could also be argued, along the lines of the big-M, little-m Marine controversy, that a backward step was taken the day we stopped using the capital in "my Command." However, this essay is not addressed primarily to either of these theses, but rather to that modern-day bugaboo known as the "Personnel Situation." Stylists will kindly note that the choice of capitalization is considered fully justified by the tone of voice in which these chilling words are usually delivered.

In the Marine Corps today there is a small, but select group which appears to assert ownership of the Personnel Situation. They could not respect it more had they invented it. Such individuals, asked to accomplish a training mission, may be identified by the rapidity with which they whip out their pocket notebook and check off the individuals of their unit—each of them an irreplaceable key man, of course—who will be absent on the day in question. Such types will frequently cap their argu-

ment as to why nothing can be done by pointing out in hushed tones that they have a number of men on mess duty and several on leave.

Another school of thought treats the Personnel Situation with awe, as if loss of personnel from training for administrative reasons were as unpredictable a catastrophe as having a purple people eater get loose in the south squad bay. "We planned the training," they confide, "but a lot of things came up today." Both of these schools of thought appear to share a common hope, the hope being that if we all shut our eyes tight, the Personnel Situation will just go away. Some fine morning, they feel, the First Sergeant will appear all smiles, the grass will mow itself, the troops will all sign pledges to avoid sickness and forego leave. On such a day, when there are no office hours and no transfer orders, we must all buckle down and start training.

There is indeed, a personnel situation (serious, but not worth capitalization). Manning levels do run below T/O from time to time. Leave, liberty, sickness and mess duty, we have always with us. Field exercises mean commitment, not only of participating units, but of TAD personnel from other units for Aggressors and umpires. Mandatory school quotas, base assistance programs, and special projects mean more TAD. If not regulated, the cumulative effect of these administrative requirements is considerable. Add it to an abnormally high transfer and discharge ratio, caused by short-term enlistments, and a unit commander may well feel that he has gotten trapped in a revolving door, with lots of rotation but no forward progress. It is all too easy to find an FMF unit, with less than 50 per cent of on-

board strength, participating in key training. When such a unit is found, however, it will also be found that the proper people are not talking to each other.

All too often training schedules neither reflect nor attempt to reflect what is actually going on in the unit. A training schedule, of course, should not double as a plan of the day, but neither can it ignore the plan of the day, or vice-versa. There must be coordination between a field day and a field firing exercise. An event such as giving GMST tests must be reflected in some form in training planned. Certainly, the rather obvious fact that all hands do not participate in all training periods should somewhere be noted and reconciled in the training plan. However, training must take priority over the PX, personal missions and petty administration. Mess duty, leave, the guard and much TAD, are not isolated and unpredictable catastrophes. We must learn to live with the personnel situation, which, despite attacks in many areas will probably get worse before it gets better. We must live with it, and at the same time accomplish our mission of real training.

The 4 corners of an effective training program are these: a desire to train, proper planning, adequate participation and effective supervision. Effective instruction itself is the keystone.

A desire to train implies that a leader has certain training he feels he must accomplish to fit his troops so that "they may, without question, beat any force opposed to them in the field."

This means training to fight a war. It should be noted that few wars have been fought in a classroom. True, it is easy to arrange for a classroom, blackboard, chalk—maybe even a training film. It is more difficult to arrange a field problem, or a period of instruction in the field. Likewise, it is relatively easy to prepare a lecture or to find one instructor, and perhaps an alternate or assistant instructor. It is more difficult to plan and supervise coach-and-pupil instruction, or any period of instruction in which the proper sequence of explanation-demonstration-application-examination-review is followed. Nevertheless, the leader who really wants to train should

want equally much to get his troops to the field and to get his material into their minds to stay. He knows that of all means of instruction the classroom lecture has the least penetration power and is least retained. Accordingly, he will want to get his material across through the eyes, from the sense of touch, from muscle memory of drills properly done, supervised and repeated. This desire to train for war, properly implemented, will carry through to the troops. We cannot expect Marines to be enthusiastic in training or, first, to reenlist if they feel they are cogs of doubtful purpose in a mysterious machine which whirs menacingly but turns out no product. The activities in which an individual Marine can easily spend an average day may have, in themselves, little meaning. To the individual they may never be related to his part in fighting a war or to his mission of being ready to fight one.

The leader who really wants to train and to make his men want to train must emphasize three-dimensional, high-fidelity training. This means getting away from the one dimension of the classroom to a full simulation of the battlefield by sight, sound, smell and touch. It means an integrated exercise such as a CPX, FEX, or FFEX, rather than simple section or unit training. It means realistic controls giving exercise to ordnance specialists, mine probers, mechanics and clerks. This type of

exercise is harder to set up than the type of "problem" in which the existence and function of all higher, lower, and parallel echelons and staff sections is blithely ignored. A successful exercise of this nature cannot be set up without previous experience, not only in the proper play, but in the most economical, efficient and realistic control procedures. The short-line CPX provides an ideal place to start. Analysis and critique can expand such a successful exercise to a full-scale CPX and later a FFEX.

Is this extra effort worth the trouble? Will it help give to the individual Marine the meaning of his job and the job of his unit? All of us have seen that extra spark of interest during a live firing problem. Blanks and simulators also get quicker response by being a more simple and direct approach to the problem than a classroom lecture. Considering the amount of training ammunition, blanks and simulators available, many of them too seldom used, is it too much to ask that a major effort be made to include in each week's training at least one day in which conditions are as much like war as ingenuity can make them? The purpose of such a training period with Aggressors, blanks and simulators can be quickly grasped. Other aspects of motivation may be more difficult, particularly in the training of specialists. Sometimes artillery gun crews and truck drivers

have gone for years in a unit without ever seeing artillery rounds strike. A Marine who does not understand what his unit does will find it hard to understand his own job. Regardless of what he must learn to be a gunner or a driver, there must be training time to stimulate his desire to learn by giving him, if not the big picture, at least the picture of his whole battery, company or battalion. The CPX affords a better opportunity many times than a full field exercise.

Likewise, the leader who desires, who is anxious, to train will inescapably have certain points he wants to stress. In the planning of training he will weigh certain periods with a higher priority than others. Of course he will hope, mildly, that the whole training schedule can be carried out, but his better judgment and experience will question this hope. Certain periods, if he really wants to train, he must be prepared to fight for. Faced with the sudden inspection, the large working party, or the loss of a training area, he will be set to re-schedule. He will make sure that key training goes forward, come high water or the IG. He will cancel or postpone the nice-to-know and the just-in-case subjects to get to the meat and potatoes. And, as he does this, he will be making more work for himself, because he will cancel or postpone the subjects that are easy to set up and teach. He will re-schedule, with extra work, those that are hardest to arrange and teach. Also, if he really wants to train men, he will ensure that in his planning the high-priority subjects are repeated, for the benefit of Marines who miss the training for so many good and sufficient reasons. Proper planning and proper administration will limit, but not eliminate, absence from training.

The leader who desires to train and has planned to train must follow through and ensure full participation. It is not enough to plan and hope. It is necessary to plan and negotiate. Training here resembles politics—often defined as the "art of the possible." Any hard-charging squad leader or section chief would like to have all his Marines for training each hour of each and every week. This is but a hope. The cold facts say otherwise.

Right this minute the First Ser-




Out of the classroom into the field for the best training

geant is busy making out several lists which mean lost training hours. Still, the gates are not closed to horse-trading. If the squad leader or section leader really wants to train, he can make a deal to have his men for that really key training period or program—at the price of not having any another time. This beats being mouse-bitten to death every day. At higher levels, companies, batteries or battalions can swap duties, quotas, or even commitments to get the proper training done with adequate participation. Key training will and must be repeated. This in itself may prove an effective training technique. Some of the extra effort that goes into re-scheduling may be saved by repeating an exercise previously accomplished. Seldom is every lesson drawn from one field problem the first time through. Since relative perfection is the necessary military goal, repetition of a properly-conceived problem is well justified. Adequate participation means getting every Marine through the essentials of his job at least once. As evidence of the scope of the problem, consider rifle qualification. It is not uncommon for a regimental or battalion S-3, after cracking the whip for 6 months to fill range quotas, to find in August that he still has more men to qualify than he did in January. This requirement constantly to go back to fundamentals does not mesh well with the juggernaut progress of the yearly training program, aimed to be progressive. Ready or not, here comes the regimental or division exercise.

These conflicting requirements to repeat the fundamentals yet to make training progressive, frequently meet head-on. In desperation, everything may be repeated, to the intense boredom of the plank owners; in the spirit of progress, new and uncharted ways may be trodden, to the confusion of the many. There are, however, ways to solve the impasse. Training which is properly conducted includes examination, preferably a practical demonstration to avoid pitfalls of lack of verbal proficiency in the student, compromise of written examinations, and inartfully drawn questions. Those who qualify by such test should not be required to sit and suffer through again. Neither should they be penalized by being placed on work-

ing parties. They may better be used as instructors or assistant instructors. As noted previously, the cornerstones of an effective training program are a strong desire to train, proper and flexible planning, adequate participation and effective supervision. The keystone, however, remains effective instruction. Learning, after all, can take place only at the point where instructor and student meet. The techniques of proper instruction are widely known. The path is well charted and marked with adequate texts and references. The requirement to begin with a well-considered lesson plan is thoroughly understood. Every Marine, at one time or another, has seen examples of some of the most effective instruction ever given—training aids, handouts, eye contact, the works. Military instruction at its best compares favorably with any teaching done anywhere. But why, so often, does it degenerate into a poorly-organized, poorly-delivered harangue?

One of the answers lies in lack of time for preparation. This may result from over-commitment of the instructor to other duties, from rapid fluctuation in the training schedule, or from lack of interest by the instructor or his superiors. A solution lies in broadening the base of instruction. More junior NCOs, or even acting NCOs, should be given assignments as instructors. Qualified privates should assist. With so many specialists, not all NCOs are given proper opportunities to develop leadership and authority which will anchor their stripes with a feeling of permanency. The instructor's platform offers a real challenge to leadership. Too many of our young officers apparently take too much to heart the precept of the Manual that the relationship between officers and men should resemble that of teacher and pupil. They are firm believers in do-it-yourself, and too frequently are teaching or preaching. In their enthusiasm



More junior NCOs should be given assignments as instructors



The instructor usually learns more than the student

to train, they forget the basic fact of human nature that we all pay little attention to the man who talks too much. Over-exposure to an instructor drastically reduces effectiveness. The major gain from such a procedure is that, since the instructor usually learns much more than the students, these young officers are being trained. However, they deny this training value of researching a lesson to their junior leaders.

In other units, another approach is taken: all instruction is placed in the hands of NCOs, but usually the senior ones. The advantages and disadvantages of this course are obvious. It is clear that a program of effective instruction requires more and better instructors. Officers, senior NCOs and junior NCOs, must all be used. Full advantage must be taken of technique of instruction schools. The training schedule itself should serve as a vehicle for developing more and better instructors.

Another way in which the problem of lack of time for preparation may be attacked is by a share-the-wealth program. Most unit training SOPs require that files of lesson and training plans be maintained, but the value of such files varies. An instructor with access to a neat, organized file centralized by the battalion S-3 is fortunate. So, too, is the battalion S-3 who has access to a file of field problems found effective in his

own and other battalions. However, there are instructors and units who are not so fortunate. Since they must start from scratch, the burden of preparing their plans to build up a proper file is exorbitant. Since they have inadequate time for the job at hand, they prepare incomplete, poorly thought out plans. This vicious circle can be broken by requiring each company or battery to pre-

pare a limited number of complete lesson plans and field problems under broad guidance to avoid duplication. The work of each will be shared, and naturally critiqued by the others. By the end of the cycle of sharing plans and orders, smooth, practical plans will be available. The same procedure can also be used within a company or battery. For maximum effectiveness, units or individuals assigned to such a program should be given maximum freedom in selecting subject matter. Obviously, a better job will be done if the subject is one that the instructor, or commander, feels is important and which he wants to teach.

Broadening the base of instruction and sharing-the-wealth in preparation are 2 available solutions to improved instruction, without which no amount of desire, planning and participation, can weld effective training. The ultimate answer rests on proper supervision. Proper supervision involves training inspections. Inspection, in some circles, is a dirty word. It is a dirty word because the normal object of an inspection is to find deficiencies and discrepancies. In the case of a normal military inspection on the field or on the bunk there does exist an aim to help the inspected unit improve itself. This help cannot be given by



What is the normal objective of an inspection?

pulling punches. Kindness is misplaced. The most effective help can be given by finding out exactly what is wrong, listing it in detail, and telling the unit commander. In some few cases, certain constructive suggestions, based on the greater experience of the inspecting officer, may be in order. Usually, when the deficiency is found, the remedy is apparent. This is the inherent nature of a military inspection. All too often a training inspection follows the same format. The inspector arrives, armed with a check list, and searches assiduously for faults. Now it is certainly to be hoped that each Marine unit and each Marine is each day perfect in all things, but perfection frequently requires special preparation. To put it another way, the unit that is perfect in all things on a training inspection has been "gun-decking"—making special preparations with the aim of impressing the inspector. Training inspections are theoretically scheduled on very short notice to avoid this very thing, but in practice the word leaks out more and more in advance. Regrettably, training inspectors who do not have the proper background are sometimes assigned to technical training. All too naturally, they concentrate their search for faults on the areas which they do understand. In general, these tend toward matters of uniform and equipment, plus a detailed check on absentees. The simple, predictable result is that a unit which is supposed to be training, and whose training the commander is allegedly having inspected, is, in fact, not training at all. Rather it is preparing for and holding an informal military inspection in the field, to the detriment of the entire day's training.

As indicated previously, there are many discrepancies in training and a search for them is a legitimate purpose of a training inspection. The fact remains that we Marines draw our pay, not for discovering problems, but for finding solutions. The solution to effective training for war does not lie in listing discrepancies. Neither is it to be found in any check list that the ingenuity of man can devise. The personnel situation in the FMF today is not an excuse for not training, it is not an alibi for discrepancies, neglect and non-performance. It is, and it will remain a

challenge. To meet that challenge will require a positive approach. We must, above all, find not what is wrong, but what's right with training. We must sort out the good ideas, the ideas that work, the short-cuts. We must spread them around and put them to use in other units. As one example only, what is the usefulness of a training inspection report citing in scathing terms the general ineffectiveness of a Headquarters Company training program? It is widely recognized that a Headquarters Company commander who can run an effective training program is the exception, a jewel to be prized. What is needed is greater knowledge of how to do this job. A qualified training inspector may be able to see a ray of light in some aspect of the program being run. He may, from his own experience, be able to provide constructive suggestions. He should aim for these clear goals: first, to help the unit help itself; second, to find and pass to other units good training ideas and techniques. It is not likely that, in the near future, training inspectors will be welcomed aboard with enthusiasm, but they should not be feared, except by those who have something to hide.

Supervision of training, or training inspections, begins at the lowest level. The place for young officers is not in the company office. Neither is it on the lecture platform. As much as possible, they should be on their feet, among the troops, watching, learning, advising. It is much harder to teach a corporal to teach a class than to teach it yourself. But this is the way that pays off in the long run. If the gunnery sergeant is the best man to teach a subject, by all means let him teach it, but let one or more officers be there to see how he does it, to learn from him, and, perhaps, to add something from their own knowledge.

Supervision of training must continue vigorously at the battalion level. On the battalion staff are gathered together, for the first time as the chain of command goes up, experts in many fields. To such expertise as they may possess, is usually added their experience at a lower echelon. The training of a battalion is not a neatly-packaged problem dropped in the S-3's "In" basket. Training is a command function; in

peacetime, it is the prime responsibility of command. As such, it is a vital area for all staff members. It is not enough that they write memoranda to the S-3 or ExO suggesting that this or that in their field be taught in so many hours. The point is rapidly reached where hours cannot be added to the training week. Neither can qualified men be hand-picked for all jobs. Staff members must constantly address themselves to the basic problem of whether, in their field, the battalion is ready, or rapidly getting ready, for combat. This cannot be determined by sitting in an office and reading the training schedule, or some other misleading piece of paper. It can only be ascertained by getting up, putting on your cover, and closing the door behind you. Staffs are busy, busy, busy, they will tell you. Few will deny that they have time to leave their office the equivalent of one day a week, if they try. Few, however, do so unless pushed.

The same considerations apply at regimental and division staff levels, but with greater force. These staff members are higher-ranking, higher-paid, more enmeshed in papers, and farther from the troop picture. At these levels, they have a greater opportunity to help cross-pollinate in the field of training ideas. Their own experience is broader and can lead to more constructive suggestions. More important, they cannot write the pieces of paper by which they live without a firm grounding in the capabilities and limitations, both theoretical and practical, of the organization they serve. This knowledge can be gained only through walking, not sitting. It does not take the troops long to see through the impractical scheme conceived in an ivory tower. Such schemes and directives, impossible of realistic compliance, rapidly lead to distrust of the originating echelon. In point of fact, such distrust, or at least lack of full confidence, too often exists without a valid reason, based on general principles alone. The solution to achieving the essential teamwork between staffs rests in getting out of the office, not only to learn, to get acquainted, but to advise and help. A well-conceived training inspection program will help both the inspectors and the inspected to do a better job.

The personnel situation, the new requirements of know-how implicit in the modern concept organization, and the world situation, all reinforce the need for more effective training per hour of training time. We must achieve better combat readiness through better training, based on optimum techniques of instruction. We must frame training programs based on a desire to train, proper prior planning to preclude poor performance, participation rather than excuses, and a rejuvenated, active approach to effective supervision.

Profitable avenues of approach to the problem include:

1) Frequent, regular emphasis on the combat mission of the unit and the Marine, stressing live firing.

2) Three-dimensional training in lieu of the one dimension of the classroom; use Aggressors, simulators and your imagination.

3) Training priorities to ensure that "must-know" subjects are taught effectively, regardless of extra work to re-schedule.

4) Repetition of key instruction, avoiding needless duplication while maintaining progress.

5) Broadening the base of instruction, by using junior NCO's.

6) Share-the-wealth projects of allocating problems and subjects for unit preparation to build up rapidly an effective training and lesson plan file.

7) Participation by walking staff members in planning, conduct and supervision of training, to ensure the command function of training a unit combat-ready in all areas of staff concern is accomplished.

8) Intra-unit liaison between squad leaders and first sergeants, S-1 and S-3, S-3 and G-3, to keep the ax of administrative requirements from chopping out the main trunk of the training program, even if branches must go.

9) Training inspections oriented toward help, not hindrance; answers, not problems; facts, not theory; and real training, not lip service.

10) A general trend to more covers on, more feet off the desk, more field work, and considerably less talk about the personnel situation and other problems.


The personnel situation may be licked, if it is licked, partly by the type of approach represented by the new pay bill. Improved personnel

assignment and administrative procedures may represent a partial solution. Nothing done in any area will induce the type of Marine we must have to reenlist unless he is doing, and feels he is doing, a useful, constructive job. The job of a Marine in the FMF is, quite simply, to train for war. The job of a non-FMF Marine is to train personally for war and to help keep the FMF combat ready. The test of how well we are doing these jobs is the training the individual Marine gets. If we can convince him that he is being properly trained to do his important job in combat he may reenlist. If he is not so convinced, he will not ship

over and the personnel situation will grow worse.

Our success in achieving personnel stability, in being a force in real readiness, of accomplishing the first duty of any leader rests on training, actual training actually accomplished. We must, as first priority, devise, execute, supervise, and continuously revitalize training for the modern concept.

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
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WHEN CONGRESS CONSIDERED ABOLISHING THE MARINE CORPS

AN INTERPRETATION

By Harold M. Hyman



As Congressmen convened in Washington in December 1865, for their first post Civil War session, economy was a dominant item in their legislative plans. Members of both parties pledged themselves to a reduction in government expenditures and in the war-swollen tax rates. Economy made good political

sense, for the forthcoming 1866 Congressional elections would soon put all Representatives before their constituents.

American history offers a familiar pattern of postwar reductions in the nation's military forces. Over-burdened taxpayers logically demand retrenchments in the cost of government. The first and obvious target

for economy, once the guns fall silent, has been the military-naval service. In 1866, however, this demand was uneven in application. It hit the Army, relatively speaking, least of all, the Navy with far greater impact, and the Marine Corps hardest.

To be sure there are sound reasons in the history of the middle 1860's justifying what seems to be inter-service partiality on the part of the public's representatives. The Army had the only immediate martial task to perform in 1866. Indians on the western frontiers had grown increasingly troublesome during the Civil War years while the nation's energies were invested in suppressing rebellion. Napoleon III's adventure in empire-building in Mexico had created an urgent diplomatic problem for the US to counter with an impressive show of American land force. By comparison with the Navy and Marines, the postwar Army was far larger than its prewar size, and was to remain so.

No European or Asian enemy, however, existed to threaten the interests of the US on the seas. The Navy's wartime fleet, created hurriedly to blockade the nearby South Atlantic and Gulf coasts and to penetrate the river system of the Confederacy, was with few exceptions just not fit for oceanic service. It was proper for Congress to dispense with the motley fleet which had served the nation, and to keep in commission only those naval vessels capable of useful service in the postwar situation.

It was not proper, however, for Congress or the nation to dispense with the memory of what that fleet and the men who manned it had accomplished during the war. In 1866, Congress came very close to doing just that, and the legislators' indifference to naval needs reflects the public's ignorance of wartime naval accomplishments.

History affords a simple answer to explain why the exertions of the Navy and Marines had gone almost unheralded during the Civil War. The public sensed what it took Union Army generals a long time to learn: that final victory would come only when the last Southern army was destroyed as a fighting force. Thus, popular attention throughout

the war years centered largely on the Army, the generals, and the casualty lists which emerged from Bull Run, Antietam, Shiloh, Gettysburg and Cold Harbor. The life blood of the nation was on land.

The life line of the Confederacy, however, was afloat. Far less bloodily and dramatically than could be true of Army activities, Navy and Marine forces took the island chain fronting the Atlantic and Gulf states of the Confederacy, so that the Union blockade gradually strangled the economic and industrial life of the South. Under Army command, naval units made possible the invasion of the heartland of Dixie. Early in 1862 Forts Henry and Donelson fell along with New Orleans at the mouth of the Mississippi. The next year Vicksburg surrendered, and the South had been split into two parts, never to rejoin.

Naval successes rarely received sustained popular recognition. A survey of contemporary newspapers, for example, quickly reveals how little journalistic attention was paid to things afloat, except as they were associated with Army enterprises. Newspaper correspondents could not conveniently send dispatches from shipboard. They preferred to stay with land forces, convenient to telegraph stations, closer to the mass armies which for the public constituted the Union war effort. This is not to suggest that public relations alone made the Army a subject of greater concern and affection for most Americans rather than the Navy. It is to suggest that although naval services to the nation were as essential in their way as those the Army rendered, they were far less likely to attract attention. Blockade duty, and occupation service on a sandspit off the Carolina coast, contained few instances of drama once the initial occupation was completed.

The soldier was the popular hero of the Civil War. Even today, as one drives through America's small towns, the Civil War monuments uniformly depict a soldier defending the unity of his nation, almost never a sailor or a Marine. So far as most Americans were concerned, the Civil War was an Army show.

Congressmen in 1866, by and large, shared the public's careless in-

attention to naval achievements. They wished to cut government expenditures. And, for a segment of the Republican Party's members in Congress, a third motive existed in 1866 for an attack on the Navy and Marines.

That third reason was symbolized by the incumbent Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles. All during the Civil War, Welles had served Lincoln in that office. His energy had helped create the naval forces which were so important in achieving Union victory. But Welles was no one to play party politics with the Navy he came to love. With Lincoln's firm support, Welles kept the Navy Department out of the tangled jungle of intra-Republican Party factions.

With Lincoln's death, Welles continued in the Navy Secretaryship under Andrew Johnson. Congress, meanwhile, came under the control of the group of Republican leaders who most energetically detested Welles. When Johnson split with the Republican Party early in 1866 on the question of the best way to reconstruct the defeated South, the stage was set for a monumental battle between President and Congress.

In this battle the Marine Corps became a pawn. The Congress proceeded to harass Welles with a series of legislative investigations of his conduct as Navy Secretary. And, because Congress by this time was pretty sure that the Army commander, Ulysses Grant, was on their side, legislators proceeded to try to take as much Navy control as they could from Welles' direction and to place that control in the Army.

Thus, in June 1866, the House of Representatives resolved that its Committee on Naval Affairs consider "... the expediency of abolishing the marine corps, and transferring it to the army, and of making provision for supplying such military force as may be needed in the navy, by detail from the army." The Naval Affairs Committee members were, in the main, part of the Republican faction most unsympathetic to Welles and, by implication, to anything connected with the Navy. Most contemporary commentators expected that the Committee would report quickly, and recommend the extinction of the Marine Corps.

Six months later this Committee reported to the House. Its conclusions surprised Congressmen, Republicans and Democrats alike. For that report indicated that the Committee members had become firm supporters of the Marine Corps and Navy.

Marines, the report stated, "... are strictly infantry soldiers trained for service afloat." Although they often "pull and haul in common with the rest of the crew," seagoing Marines also provided ships' captains with disciplinary control, reserve cannoners, landing forces, and any duty... the prompt discharge of which is as necessary to the safety of a ship as reefing or furling. Further, the Committee decided, Marines' duties in protecting public property ashore more than compensated the taxpayers for the costs of maintaining the separate Corps. To replace Marines on shipboard with an equivalent number of equally useful sailors would create no fiscal economy or provide the disciplinary controls which naval officers required. To assign soldiers to guard duties then performed by Marine detachments meant merely a shifting of personnel, without guarantee of an increase in efficiency or a reduction in costs.

Instead of abolishing the Corps, the Committee proposed that Congress enlarge its size and increase its functions. Pointing to Marine establishments then existing in England and France, the legislators argued that American Marines should create a mobile artillery force, capable of use on ship and shore. The Committeemen then proposed that the Corps commandant, by tradition a colonel, should be promoted to brigadier general, for he was in charge of 90 officers and 3,600 enlisted men then constituting the Marines, yet ranked equally with Army colonels responsible for less than a thousand men.

The Naval Affairs Committee report probably saved the Marine Corps, if not from extinction, at least from further troublesome and embarrassing encounters in Congress. The House of Representatives put the report aside in favor of the more pressing business at hand of the reconstruction of the South, and never got back to it. It

Mr. Hyman, an Assistant Professor of American History at the University of California at Los Angeles, served in the Marine Corps from 1941 to 1945, attaining the rank of Master Technical Sergeant. He is the author of two books on loyalty tests and numerous articles. For the past seven years he has been teaching college and doing research in American History at: Earlham College, City College of New York, Columbia University, Arizona State College and UCLA.

is instructive to go behind the formal report of the Committee and to seek to understand how the Corps gained friends and supporters in Congress from among men who by logic should have remained unsympathetic if not openly antagonistic.

In the dusty, bulky manuscript records of this Committee rests the probable answer. These records illustrate, first, how the Committee worked. First of all, it by-passed Navy Secretary Welles completely, and requested a baker's dozen senior naval officers to indicate in person or by mail how they felt concerning the utility of the Corps. Welles wisely permitted the naval officers to

hearken to Congress' summons when his opinion on the proprieties of the situation was requested.

From the most prominent naval commanders of the Civil War the Committee received an overwhelming vote of confidence in the desirability, indeed the necessity, of continuing the Marine Corps. If any naval officer rated popular acclaim in 1866, it was Adm Farragut, and his unstinting praise of the Marines he had commanded at New Orleans carried weight. "They work," wrote Farragut, "and fight their guns well." Adm Porter was even more vehement: "If the marines are abolished half the efficiency of the navy will

be destroyed." Commander Roe offered his opinion that, "It is impossible to substitute soldiers of the army for marines. The marines are sea-soldiers; they are half-sailors, and have a special training which the land soldiers cannot have." Similar testimonials came from the entire roster of senior naval officers. Without dissent they agreed that an efficient US Navy required Marines in order to meet the unpredictable, changing demands which the nation imposed upon its naval service.

After assembling these tributes to the Corps, the hardworking Congressmen of the Naval Affairs Committee dug deeper. They invested a substantial part of six months in assembling, in manuscript form, a history of the Corps from its establishment in 1776 to the end of the Civil War. So well, indeed, did the raw historical evidence speak for the Marines that it converted unsympathetic Committeemen into active supporters of the Navy and Marines. Marginal notes which Committee members penned to documents of Corps accomplishments reveal how, in diligently seeking to evaluate the worth of the Marine establishments in the past, the Congressmen saw their way to their conclusion of the need for the Corps in the future.

Out of this excursion into historical research, the members of the House Naval Affairs Committee concluded that the Navy and the nation required a Marine Corps. This incident is an almost unknown, yet stirring tribute to the US Marines. Congress, however, neither abolished nor enlarged the Corps. The commandant remained a colonel, and many decades were to pass before the Congressmen's concepts of Marine artillery units were to become a reality.

For its time, the House Naval Affairs Committee of 1867 was a forward-looking group of men who, in their report on the Marine Corps, exhibited commendable flexibility and sincere regard for their nation's security. The episode of the 1867 report suggests the need for an historical outlook by legislators and a consciousness of Corps history by Marines. That history, in 1867, left the Marine Corps alive to meet the future situations which it would have well in hand. **USMC**

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OBSERVATION POST

THE SCHOOL SOLUTION

1ST MAR DIV, CAMP PENDLETON, CALIF. — Field artillery in general today, needs an internal remodeling. The value of artillery as a supporting arm is known throughout the Marine Corps. A great number of individuals who will read this article have seen the practical aspects of artillery in combat.

Field Artillery, that we are familiar with, is found in the 3 Marine Divisions as well as Force Troops units. Non-artillery men probably assume that the techniques of artillery are the same regardless of the unit to which we are assigned. From the very basic aspect of artillery this assumption is correct, but for *gunnery* which is the pulse of artillery nothing could be farther from the truth.

The Marine Corps spends many dollars each year sending officers and enlisted men to Fort Sill, Okla., "The Artillery Center." Good sound gunnery and tactics are taught to our people. The artillery school works 365 days a year to prove or disprove any logical gunnery technique. Many of these techniques are being developed by Marines stationed there.

Most Marine students work very hard at this school, as their class standing proves. They return to a Marine artillery unit bursting with the latest gunnery procedure, willing to teach or explain their new found knowledge. Much to their dismay they are met with, "We don't do it that way in this battalion."

"But, Sir, at Fort Sill they taught us . . ."

"I don't care what they taught you at Fort Sill. In this battalion we always point the guns West, because that's the way we did it on Iwo."

Where has that Battalion Commander been since Iwo? Artillery has been remodeled twice since WW II. Why train our junior officers and enlisted personnel if they have to live in the shadow of Mount Suribachi?

This brings us up to the 2 words which best describe our "constant cannon confusion" — *ground rules*.

The author does not mean to imply any derogatory remarks against ground rules as such, but towards *Artillery Gunnery Ground Rules*. Why can't all artillery units in the Marine Corps use the same gunnery methods and procedures? What a man learns today in one battalion will not necessarily hold true tomorrow if he is transferred to another battalion or division.

To emphasize some of the differences in "Gunnery Ground Rules" a few basic examples are brought to the reader's attention. Fort Sill teaches on the completion of a registration, using an observed firing chart, you back plot the batteries from a common registration point. Some organizations in the Marine Corps teach and practice just the opposite. This writer knows of 3 different methods being practiced in the Marine Corps at present in the registration of illuminating shells. One method is to adjust this shell on the gun-target line, another is to adjust on the observer-target line, and the third is a home made graphical-firing table. Field Manual 6-40 only mentions the gun-target method. All 3 methods might be proven to be very satisfactory by the using unit, but how many more methods are in practice at this time?

We all use the same field manual, FM 6-40. The Army teaches our students word for word from this manual. What's wrong with this

field manual that displeases so many of our officers? If it's not to be followed, then why do we retain it?

Fellow Marines, the importance of unification throughout artillery units cannot be overemphasized. The artillery must be able to give close support to all or any front line units. Any artillery battery may be assigned the mission of reinforcement for, or attachment to, an artillery battalion other than its parent organization. Without going into detail, I'm sure the reader can surmise the complication that could develop if these units had their own gunnery ground rules.

This article is not written to give the reader *the* solution to this constant cannon confusion but rather *a* solution in hopes of stimulating all artillerymen to bring forth ideas and eliminate this confusion.

A solution is to form an artillery board to be located at HQMC. This board should be headed by at least a general officer. The actual number of members of the board could be worked out by HQMC. The important point is that these members, regardless of rank, be artillery school-trained as well as having served in an artillery unit.

This suggested board would have no command function over any artillery, but policies and techniques brought forth by this board would have to be carried out by all Marine Corps artillery units. This board would not be confined to just field artillery, but all types of weapons that require precision in firing, such as anti-aircraft, tanks and missiles. Gunnery for all types of weapons would be the most important aspect of this board.

Another major function of this board would be the recommendation for adoption by the Marine Corps of new types of missiles. Missiles are considered as artillery so the placement of these new units would come from this board.

Let me say again that this is only one solution, but it is felt that consideration should be given development of a board of some type.

Capt W. C. Keith

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ORGANIZE FOR TRAINING

◆ COMPHIBRON 6, FPO, NEW YORK
—Bearing in mind the fact that all Marines are to be contributing members to the fighting potential of our Corps, organization of our headquarters units for training purposes does not approach this goal. In this type of unit, such as those found at large bases or administrative units, the men in the company work for several different sections. These sections are of all sizes; small, such as a 6-man S-1 section; or larger, such as a 19-man supply section.

Their specialist training is not lacking, because of formal schools and on-the-job training. These programs are generally well laid out and well exploited by all departments. However, when we evaluate the general military training we usually run smack into a rock wall. We have organized our 19-man supply section into 4 fireteams and we are training our men on that basis. We schedule numerous training periods for drill or for general military subjects, but at each training period we have available only a certain number of men because of various factors, not the least certainly is the fact that the supply officer would like to get some work done. This is admirable, but the company commander would also like to prepare the organization for the task it might be called upon to perform. With our 4-fireteam supply section, we have one squad plus a fireteam. The loose fireteam is not useful to anyone. It immediately loses integrity with the supply section if it is assigned to a squad made up predominantly of the S-3 section. They are not under the cognizance of the S-3 officer or NCOs, so there is no interest other than that of the company commander in their ability or state of training. This situation is prevalent throughout the headquarters company.

Whenever there are inspections scheduled, there is always a requirement for "essential" people to stay in each of the various offices as standby personnel. This policy is readily endorsed by the officer in charge of the section concerned. This causes last-minute juggling of men in fireteams and fireteams in squads. Consequently, many times the men

standing next to each other do not know their functions in the fireteam, or squad, and are not proficient in drill at that position. After the personnel inspection the inspecting officer usually utters the dreaded words "Drill the platoon." The platoon leader and company commander can only close their eyes, grit their teeth and watch the men stumble around from lack of practice. If questioned on infantry tactics they show the same unfamiliarity with facts they must know to be considered well trained. There is then the stock patter about this being a headquarters unit with no time available for drill or unit training. If we continue to follow this path of least resistance, we are in fact condoning poor training practices and courting unpreparedness.

Do we have to train our headquarters personnel as infantry? It is a time-honored custom that we are Marines first, specialists second. However, this does not mean we must *all* be trained infantrymen. Why train the supply section as 4 fireteams? Why train the S-1 section of 6 men as one and one-half fireteams? There is no requirement for it. Let's correlate the size of these various sections with different type units within the regimental structure and organize, and arm, them accordingly.

Let's examine our 6-man S-1 section. We have several options open to us. We can make it a machine gun squad (T/O of 5 men) and the senior man can train as section leader. The S-1 section would be armed with the weapons for a machine gun squad and when it falls out for inspection or for tactics instruction it would fall out as a machine gun squad. Each man would know every other job in the squad and juggling within that or another organization would not be necessary. If a standby had to be left in the office there could easily be one less at the inspection because of this very reason. For training periods, those available could easily study and practice gun drill without the requirement for all personnel to be there. This defect would not hamstring them as it would trying to do fireteam tactics with perhaps only 2 men available per fireteam. In another case we might make them into a rocket

squad. True, a rocket squad calls for 7 men and we are one light, but this would be better than the one and one-half fireteams. They could be equipped with a rocket launcher and practice ammunition. The comments concerning training made about the machine gun squad hold true here also. These men would be trained machine gunners or rocket men if the need ever came up and not untrained or poorly trained infantrymen. We have other choices that could be made if these were not suitable.

How is our 19-man supply section faring all this time? Suppose we organize our supply section into an 81mm mortar section minus the FO team. The 81mm mortar section normally contains 22 men. Omitting the FO team makes the strength 19. The other members could be trained as FOs to make up for this, and increase their value to the section. The section would have the equipment of the 81mm section and would train as such. Like the S-1 section, when it is subject to inspection and training it is as a mortar section—not 4 infantry fireteams.

There are many advantages to this course of action over our present system. The number of training periods scheduled is generally that number necessary to accomplish the training required for the entire unit and are scheduled at the times the entire unit can best get together in one group. This, however, immediately causes friction because that will inevitably be the time for annual audit of service record books, or weapons have to be issued, or a new load of supplies just came in, or some other one of the millions of tasks required to be performed by the component units of the company. That, of course, means those people are unavailable for training. This has a paralyzing effect on the entire organization because it cannot work as the unit that it is.

It has to be realized that this defect is only evident to a drastic degree in our non-combatant units outside the FMF. Personnel in those units perform the same job in combat as well as in garrison. Also it would be necessary to make a little effort and exercise consideration on each and every individual unit to determine how best to organize it to

get the maximum of training for the men and the Corps, and how to match the ranks existing within the organization with those rated in the assigned organization. If it were then necessary to use these people, they could be filtered into our units as highly-trained, capable members of the fighting machine rather than as poorly-trained individuals.

Capt Albert R. Bowman

KNOWLEDGE NOT CONFUSION

✿ MCS, QUANTICO, VA. — Our commitments, including normal, routine duties, do not afford us the luxury of having all personnel specialists on the drill field — not if we want specialists in all our other billets as well. We have all seen and admired trick drill, but motivation to excel was a primary factor, and performing before an audience added any other incentive necessary. Yet, when you analyze (and observe) squad drill, just as much precision as in any trick drill is required in order to be executed exactly as prescribed, but you do not have the corresponding motivation — especially when the leader, in most cases, is just one step above the man in the formation as far as knowledge of squad drill is concerned. Modifying 13-man drill to 8-man drill is still not the complete solution, as the complex steps are still there, and as far as the individual is concerned, nothing has been made less complicated.

Stability is certainly desirable, and a return to the day when we always see the same faces falling out into the same positions each drill period would solve the problem. However, in most units where this condition could possibly exist, usually the time devoted to drill is negligible because of more pressing commitments.

At one time Field Manual 22-5 was used as the drill manual, at least for some units within the Marine Corps. Why shouldn't we take advantage of this well written manual, which has already been time tested. After all, FM 7-10 has been very beneficial, both in peace and in war.

At most posts and stations where the majority of personnel are specialists, drill periods, of necessity, are

not too frequent or lengthy. Squad drill never becomes totally satisfactory because the motivation to learn the different complicated positions just isn't there. Also time is a big factor as all organizations try hard to do assigned jobs and not fall behind with various work schedules. Often they are short handed. Hence, when drill is conducted, it is felt by many that the drill is interfering with more important duties, duties which usually will have to be made up. Results: efficiency suffers and proficiency is sacrificed as personnel do not devote their full talent to the drill period at hand.

Somewhat the same conditions exist in FMF units. The primary purpose of rifle companies is not proficiency in drill. To be proficient in the possible tasks which in the event of an emergency a rifle company may be called upon to perform is a full time training assignment, and not one which permits unlimited time in learning drill. Complacency and just following the lead of the man in front of you is not an excuse for precision.

I have spent two years aboard ship teaching and supervising 8-man drill to a stable Marine Detachment, and two years in an infantry battalion which was changing over from LPM drill to 13-man squad drill and I am convinced that neither the 8-man nor the 13-man drill completely meets peacetime needs if we are looking for proficiency as well as leadership in all ranks.

Drill is highly important, as everyone knows. Nothing instills discipline more than short, snappy drill periods. However, in order to be the sharp unit we all want to be, but yet not go overboard in the proportion of time needed for proficiency, which is only one of the many skills which make good Marines, a type of drill easier to perfect is mandatory.

By changing over to FM 22-5, and without sacrificing complacency, we can still have our junior NCOs drill, instruct, and inspect their own squads, still develop capable young men, with knowledge, and not confusion, as their background.

Capt M. E. White

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PASSING IN REVIEW

SHERMAN: Soldier, Realist, American

B. H. LIDDELL HART. 453 pages, with maps. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., N. Y. \$7.50

Viewed purely as a military feat, Sherman's advance to and the capture of Atlanta would earn him a niche in the hall of fame. Tied to a single railroad for his line of supplies, he advanced 130 miles through difficult and poorly mapped country in the face of a stubborn and skillful foe.

Although tied to a direct line of strategic approach, he had maneuvered so skillfully within the limits thus imposed upon him that he gained each of the stepping stones on his way to the goal, and finally the goal itself, without committing his troops to a direct attack—except at Kennesaw Mountain. Even that direct attack had been based upon the calculation that it would be psychologically indirect, because of the suddenness of the change from his previous practice of turning his foe out of position.

In contrast, the enemy had considered it necessary—twice during Johnston's tenure and 4 times during Hood's—to throw themselves in vain assaults on the key positions in which Sherman's maneuvers had placed him. And from each enemy failure, Sherman had drawn the advantage of a fresh movement forward. Thus by maneuver Sherman had drawn an opponent, acting on the strategic defensive, into a series of costly tactical offensives, and at the same time had maintained an almost continuous progress towards his goal.

The Atlanta campaign deepened Sherman's grasp of the truths that the way to success is strategically along the line of least expectation and tactically along the line of least resistance, and that the general can best achieve a coincidence of the two

by taking an approach which provides for a duality of objectives—"the horns of a dilemma either of which is worth a battle." This assures a flexibility whereby he can not only deceive his opponent, but assures himself the opportunity of penetrating the opponent's guard and achieving at least one of his alternative objectives.



Sherman: Soldier, Realist, American is the story of contradiction with a logical and enlightening harmonization. Opposed to oppression, William Tecumseh Sherman visited economic ruin on a large portion of the South, yet staked his reputation on a peace of conciliation—and lost. In telling the story of the man, an interesting, valuable study of the influence of economic and psychological factors upon the course of modern war is presented. This book is far more than another recitation of the battles of the Civil War. Operations in war are not decided by what the situation actually is, but by what the opposing commanders think it is. It is in the telling of the information they had, when they received it, and what action they took that the author has benefited the military student.

Capt B. H. Liddell Hart is a respected and familiar author to the student of military affairs. He has written some 30 works on military affairs and is one of the foremost military theorists of our time. Educated at Cambridge University, twice wounded in WWI, he became military correspondent for *The London Daily Telegraph* and later for *The*

London Times. From 1937 to 1938, he was personal advisor to the British war minister, Leslie Hore-Belisha. *Sherman: Soldier, Realist, American* is an outstanding work and this reviewer would thank him for writing it.

Reviewed by Maj Louis S. Hollier, Jr.

Ed: Maj Hollier is attached to the NROTC Unit at the University of Minnesota.

SURVIVAL IN THE SKY

CHARLES COOMBS. 256 pages, illustrated. William Morrow & Co., Inc., N.Y. \$3.75

The most important single factor in the supersonic era is the human being. Here we get into areas where heretofore, unknown conditions exist. Never before has man traveled at speeds greater than the speed of sound, at altitudes in excess of 100,000 feet or roughly 17 miles, and where oxygen is for all practical purposes non-existent. All these factors plus many others, create situations and barriers that must be overcome in order that the human pilot can survive in the sky. The author presents the problems which exist and then tells of the solutions and the attempts to solve them. The effects of gravity on man are being researched on the Rocket Sled; in instrumented ejection seats; and with "artificial gravity" created by huge "40G" centrifuges. In these machines pilot reactions are determined when unusual "loads" are placed on the individual in turns, dives, climbs and unusual maneuvers.

Solar radiation is becoming quite a common term, but how it affects survival is not too well known. In this book the author does a fine job of explaining this problem in laymen's terms. The capabilities of human beings are rapidly reaching the saturation point. The answer to this problem is cybernetics—or the performing of many functions by machines which require only one or two pilot reactions. This all comes about with speeds which will not permit the pilot to think.

Survival in the Sky is a well written book of facts. The style is interesting and tends to convey to the reader that in this age of space travel the insurmountable obstacles become small barriers once the research and development commences.

Reviewed by LtCol P. H. Kellogg

Ed: The reviewer is a member of the Marine Corps Equipment Board at MCS, Quantico, Va.

Marine Corps Gazette • April 1959

THE FLEET THAT HAD TO DIE


RICHARD HOUGH. 207 pages, illustrated. Viking Press, N.Y. \$3.95

Here is a story of a man and his achievement. The man—the reader will remember long after the name (Adm Rozhestvensky) has, perforce, been forgotten. The achievement—the near solution of an unsolvable problem in naval command and logistics which contemporary naval men foredoomed. They were right, but the Admiral by sheer force of his personality, drive and will power came much closer than the experts thought possible.

All this occurred during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, in which Adm Rozhestvensky was given the mission of taking the Russian Imperial Baltic Fleet, an odd collection of 42 obsolete vessels manned by untrained and subversive crews, half-way round the world to relieve the siege at Port Arthur and destroy the Japanese Fleet enroute. He failed and his fleet was destroyed at Tsushima in a most decisive fleet action. The effects of this battle were far reaching. It marked the emergence of Japan as a world power and helped set off the Russian Revolution. A side feature of this book tells again of the age-old conflict between the local commander who sees the situation quite differently from his seniors who are far removed from the scene of battle.

A highlight of *The Fleet That Had To Die* is that we can see just how far the Russian Navy has come in 50 years. In 1905, it must have been just about the worst in naval history! The author relates the tragedy-comedy of how things were in the "old" Russian Navy. If a ship's captain didn't like the signal from the flag ship, he would ignore it. The Admiral's solution was to fire his main battery across the offender's bow to make him more alert for signals. While saluting a passing naval vessel, the Russians fired a round into one of their own iron-clads. The ship carrying ammo for the heavy guns turned out to be carrying cold weather clothing. The target towing ship was hit during gunnery practice. Running aground was common. The flag code was not distributed to all ships. All maneuvers except column formation was abandoned as beyond the

capability of the fleet, etc., etc. The clincher came one night when an English fishing fleet was encountered at rest. A great naval engagement followed with a complete victory for the Imperial Fleet with the enemy routed. These incidents and many more are put together in a crackling good story which maintains a high level of interest from the first page to the last.



Subtly interwoven is the story of Adm Togo, and how he brought Japan from a fourth-rate naval power in the Far East to a leading position. Mr. Hough neatly spins the tale of Togo's raid on Port Arthur in 1904 which was similar to the Pearl Harbor attack of his latter day peer, Adm Yamamoto.

A "well done" to Richard Hough!

Reviewed by Capt K. R. Steele

Ed: Capt Steele, a frequent contributor of letters and anecdotes to the *Gazette*, writes a weekly column for the station newspaper at MCB 29 Palms, Calif.

IN FLANDERS FIELDS

LEON WOLFF. 308 pages, illustrated. The Viking Press, Inc., N. Y. \$5.00

Wars of attrition had been fought prior to WWI, but never before had there been such machine guns and concentrations of artillery. The principles of maneuver and surprise could rarely be used. As a result, thousands were slaughtered in battle after battle of the opposing masses. During the Somme campaign, under Foch, the Allied Powers lost 794,000 compared to 538,000 of the Central Powers. By the end of 1916, two and a half million men had been killed out of a total of 7 million casualties. In England, it was agreed that the war was coming along miserably. The military was blaming the politicians and vice versa.

After establishing the atmosphere of this backdrop, *In Flanders Fields* describes the 1917 campaign, and in particular, British military and political leadership. The central character is Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, British Commander on the Western Front. His political protagonist is Prime Minister Sir David Lloyd George, who considered Haig "a clumsy, murderous fool," for prosecuting costly frontal attacks in the West instead of shifting to the Eastern flank or elsewhere. Sir Douglas, however, had the firm conviction that fighting a war of attrition on the Western Front was the only way to decisive victory. As a result, the two went their separate ways in planning for 1917, each having only mutual contempt for the other.

The first half of 1917 was disastrous to the Allies. In another battle of the Somme, the French, under Nivelle, lost 120,000 men in a maximum penetration of 2 miles. Fifty-four French divisions mutinied; the French could not be counted on for a major offensive in the near future.

Now it was Haig's turn. His plan was aggressive; he was convinced it was decisive. He would mount an offensive in the Belgian province of Flanders, and drive 30 miles to the Channel, in conjunction with a co-ordinated amphibious assault. His first preparation was to eliminate a salient in his lines, a fantastic area of mining and countermining. It was relatively successful.

Meanwhile, however, the Germans had learned of the coming offensive and had moved artillery and reserves into strong defensive positions. Lloyd George exploded when he read in a German paper that the Germans were prepared for the coming British offensive. Haig was called home, and by the barest margin convinced George and the politicians that he should continue with the offensive on condition that it would be broken off if it showed signs of failure. The Flanders campaign was now inevitable.

Without going into detail to describe the author's outstanding account of the Flanders fighting, we can draw certain conclusions and lessons. A battle of attrition, it can be judged by the grisly system of counting comparative losses. From 31

(Continued from page 61)

July to December, the Allies gained four and a half miles and lost about half a million men; the Germans lost about 270,000. The author points out that many persons have taken sides on whether or not the end justified the means. The reader will undoubtedly agree with his obvious feeling that it did not.

Why was this slaughter allowed to happen, in spite of the revulsion by the end of 1916 to huge losses of men? Haig apparently considered himself to be a man of destiny. He was convinced that Flanders was the point of decision. Once selected, he adhered to it tenaciously in spite of enemy buildup, dire predictions of weather and terrain obstacles, and warnings of subordinate commanders. He was unduly influenced by his G-2, Gen Charteris, who made a fatuous "Home by Christmas" prediction in the middle of the campaign which strikes a familiar note to the Chosin Reservoir veterans. Charteris continuously drew a false picture for his chief, and for the British press. The wonder of it all is that the "dogged courage of the British infantrymen persisted — a phenomenon almost beyond the understanding," in view of the circumstances.

Considering the premise under which the campaign was waged, that it would be broken off if showed signs of failure, why did Lloyd George allow it to continue? Apparently, because of his personality, he did not want to risk a "frontal attack" at the expense of his own position.

The book attempts to draw an object lesson on the comparative military and civilian mentalities, to the

derogation of the military, obviously an unpalatable opinion to most military readers. It is a reminder of the public discussions of legislation to enlarge and centralize military staff direction of the armed forces, and the quoting of Clemenceau's dictum, "War is too important to be left to the generals." Importantly, however, it causes reflection on the present national and world situation of political military control of the policies of massive retaliation and employment of atomic weapons. Once started, who will stop the atomic battle and how?

In Flanders Fields is highly recommended reading for Marines who desire an inside review of problems at the highest levels of military and political leadership during a critical period of the First World War.

Reviewed by LtCol H. J. Woessner, Jr.

Ed: Formerly assigned to the staff of the U. S. Naval Academy, the reviewer is now Commanding Officer of 1stReconBn, 1stMarDiv.

VICTORY, The Life of Lord Nelson

OLIVER WARNER. 375 pages, illustrated. Little, Brown & Co., Boston. \$6.50

Oliver Warner has captured the spirit of Nelson and the last period of battles by large sailing fleets. The book gives a brief description of Nelson's early life and family background which is important if one is to understand many of Nelson's actions in later life.

The main portion of the book is devoted to 3 main battles, The Nile, Copenhagen and the greatest victory of his life, Trafalgar. The battles are not described in detail, but provide a background and setting for the private life of Lord Nelson. The author is not attempting to show the reader tactics of sail warfare, but

rather the influences which affected Nelson: his attitude to duty, his approach to warfare and primarily the influence which Lady Hamilton had upon Nelson. It was in fact his love of Lady Hamilton that is largely responsible for making a tired Nelson see his duty, and once more return to sea and to his greatest victory. Had Lady Nelson been other than she was, the outcome of Nelson's life would have been different.

The reader is given an excellent look at the command problems which faced the Navy and Nelson during one of England's greatest periods. The author has used many excerpts from orders and letters to show the thinking in men's minds during this period. Included in the book are many of Nelson's letters, which show his attitude towards leadership and his concern for his men. The lessons which Nelson taught in leadership and his attitude to warfare are very applicable today. These may be summed up in his most famous statement on the eve of Trafalgar, "England expects that every man will do his duty."

One of the interesting features of the book is Nelson's attitude towards prize money and the rewards which he received or felt he should have received. As a result of the many rewards he did receive, Nelson entered a period of his life which almost ruined his career. In later life Nelson is shown as the tired but devoted servant to God, King and Country. He remarked as he sailed for the last time from England, "I have had their rewards now I sail with their hearts and blessings, and the fate of England."

If Nelson's outlook on the world could be summarized, it can best be



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done by using the words of his last entry in his diary:

"May the great God whom I worship grant to my country and for the benefit of Europe in general, a great and glorious victory. May no misconduct in anyone tarnish it—may humanity after victory be the predominant feature in the British fleet."

Oliver Warner has written many books concerning English sea power in the days of Nelson. His approach to Nelson is enlightening since he avoids giving an opinion on the man, but rather states the facts, good and bad. Thus he gives the reader a complete look at Nelson the man, and an opportunity to form one's own opinion of England's greatest naval hero.

Reviewed by Maj William S. Rump

Ed: Prior to assignment to Junior School, MCS, Maj Rump was attached to 12th MCRRD, Salt Lake City.

THE SOVIET SECRET POLICE

SIMON WOLIN and ROBERT M. SLUSSER.
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. N.Y. \$6.00

If historians in future years are to single out and list governmental bodies that have had pronounced effects upon all of civilization, certainly the "secret police" will be near the top of the list. Directly controlling and influencing the lives of the 900-odd million now living under communist regimes and reaching out to touch the lives of hundreds of thousands more outside this sphere, the concept of secret police as devised by the communists presents a continuing threat to the "free-er" peoples of the world. This threat continues, not from communist influence so much, as from the ways in which this form of control can be applied throughout the structure of a government.

The authors are well qualified to handle this subject. Mr. Wolin is a graduate of the University of Tashkent and has studied the Soviet government for over 30 years. Mr. Slusser studied at the Russian Institute of Columbia University, served with Military Intelligence during WWII and subsequently worked with the Research Program on the USSR.

This book is divided into 2 parts. Part I is the basic work of the authors and is a historical survey of the evolution of the Secret Police.

The second part consists of 9 essays by former Soviet citizens whose relationship to the activities of the secret police has varied from prisoner to official.

Few areas of study of the organization of the Soviet government have presented so many problems and so much difficulty as the Soviet Police. While its results were obvious, although terrifying, its methods were as obscure as its name implies. Decrees and documents establishing it and giving it direction were most difficult to find. When unearthed, the contents have been meager or fragmentary. The changes in name have added more to the confusion. Official documentation detailing the missions, functioning, composition and position within the structure of government are non-existent so to speak. The document establishing the CHEKA (The Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-revolution and Sabotage), the initial designation of the police, was not

published until 2 years after the name was changed.

In its early years, the Secret Police operated on a policy of expediency in order to preserve the dictatorship.

It is a basic concept of Marx that after the evolution of the dictatorship to a classless society, the need for coercive measures would wither away like the state. It was intended that the Secret Police would wither away. Instead it grew more powerful.

The power of the Secret Police increased prior to and during WWII. The Secret Police with its millions of slave laborers has become one of the largest economic enterprises in the world. Thus, in its role as a disciplinary organ of the Party, it controls one of the vast sources of national wealth and also of danger to the state.

Reviewed by LtCol W. F. Frank

Ed: This reviewer was Assistant Naval Attache in Moscow from March 1949 to January 1952. He is presently in Plans and Inspection Section, MCEC, MCS, Quantico, Va.

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
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17.—Corporal	1918
18.—Corporal	1925
19.—Technical Sergeant	1938
20.—Private	1942
21.—Corporal (Samoan Res Bn)	1943
22.—Private	1951

KAMAN HU2K-1



... nucleus for new helicopter concepts

Modern naval and military science has created the need for a helicopter of great flexibility. The routine requirements of performance, speed, range, endurance and load carrying ability have been extended to include compactness, automatic navigational aids, all-weather operation and simplified service and maintenance.

In short, increasing requirements have created a helicopter of streamlined performance and characteristics, the Navy's HU2K-1. This ultra-modern helicopter is the nucleus of limitless possibilities and concepts in naval and military science. Features of the HU2K-1 include:

- "Free" gas turbine power
- High speed flight
- Automatic pilot and dead reckoning navigation
- Automatic stabilization equipment
- All-metal servo-flap rotors
- In-flight rotor tracking
- "Fold-up" to minimum size in one minute
- Self-contained flotation equipment
- Electronic components accessible from within
- Easy maintenance and access to components

Pioneers in turbine powered helicopters . . . and new helicopter concepts.

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